

STUDIES OF THE HARRIMAN INSTITUTE COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Leopold H. Haimson, *Russia's Revolutionary Experience, 1905-1917*, 2005

Alexander J. Motyl, editor, *The Post-Soviet Nations:
Perspectives on the Demise of the USSR*, 1992

Alexander J. Motyl, editor, *Thinking Theoretically About Soviet Nationalities:
History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR*, 1992

Elizabeth Valkenier, *Ilya Repin and the World of Russian Art*, 1990

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY AND THE
SHADOW OF THE PAST

Edited by Robert Légvold



COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS NEW YORK

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
Publishers Since 1893
NEW YORK CHICHESTER, WEST SUSSEX

Copyright © 2007 Columbia University Press
All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Russian foreign policy in the twenty-first century and the
shadow of the past / edited by Robert Legvold
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-0-231-14122-2 (alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 0-231-14122-X

1. Russia (Federation)—Foreign relations. 2. Russia
(Federation)—Politics and government—1991. 3. Soviet
Union—Foreign relations.

DK510.764.R866 2007

327.47—dc22 2006033152



Columbia University Press books are printed on
permanent and durable acid-free paper.

This book is printed on paper with recycled content.

Printed in the United States of America

c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

*We dedicate this book to
Marshall D. Shulman,
and the model he has been*

CHAPTER 4

How Persistent Are Persistent Factors?

Alfred J. Rieber

RECENT COMMENTATORS HAVE REVIVED the idea that expansionism and exceptionalism are the driving forces of Russian foreign policy. As evidence they cite the use of oil and gas exports as a political weapon, the support of separatist or pro-Russian movements in neighboring states, and the modernization of an aging nuclear arsenal. They link these symptoms of an aggressive foreign policy to signs of a retreat from market capitalism and democracy in domestic affairs. Familiar questions have been raised regarding whether Russia is "a normal country" worthy of full membership in the newest exclusive club of the international community, the Group of Eight. Does Russia's status as a "civilized" nation require reexamination? Or are recent events a response by the new leadership to problems that periodically reoccur in the making of Russian foreign policy?

Fifteen years ago I sought to define and apply the concept of persistent factors in order to dispel three myths about the forces shaping the foreign policy of imperial Russia. The geopolitical myth attributed unlimited Russian expansion to the absence of physical barriers in the great Eurasian plain and the search for warm-water ports; the leadership myth perceived Russian expansion as an extension of the autocratic power of the ruler; and the ideological myth found the key to Russian expansion in a messianic urge originally rooted in Russian Orthodox culture and subsequently transformed by Marxism-Leninism. Although the myths are no longer widely held, they have left a legacy of suspicion and a fear of "the Russian menace." This chapter accepts the premise of continuity in Russian foreign policy but rejects single-factor, determinist theories. It offers instead an analysis that combines four long-range persistent factors and two middle-range conjunctural factors in order to accommodate both continuity and change in Soviet and post-Soviet foreign policy.

PERSISTENT FACTORS REDEFINED

Russia is no exception to the rule that the makers of foreign policy define state interests within a context of geographical and cultural factors,¹ but these factors are not fixed and immutable. They are not permanent. The physical environment shapes and modifies social organization, cultures, and the projection of power without determining them, just as purposeful human action shapes and modifies the environment by overcoming the limitations they place on action.² Spatial concepts are revised to create new symbolic geographies such as "Europe," "Eurasia," and the distinction between "West" and "East" that have so deeply influenced perceptions about Russia's place in the world.³ Like space, culture is contested, but it is not imaginary. Changes in the geo-cultural configuration of a state proceed slowly over time, if at all, and then only under great external pressure or internal upheaval.

Persistent factors are not artificial constructs; nor did they suddenly materialize at some magic moment in Russian history. They are the result of an evolutionary process, features of historical life that have their origins in the period of state formation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The four persistent factors that shape the following analysis of foreign policy are relative economic backwardness, porous frontiers, a multinational society, and cultural alienation.⁴

First, definitions of economic backwardness depend on the object of comparison, the standards of measurement, and the mutual perceptions of domestic and foreign observers. In the case of Russia the object was always "the West," which meant the more highly commercialized and industrialized countries of Western Europe and later the United States. The standards of measurement were often subjective in the early centuries of Russian history before accurate statistics were available; later they were based on quantitative data, although in the case of the Soviet Union these have proven to be highly unreliable.⁵ Mutual perceptions were reflected in the accounts of foreign travelers, diplomats, and journalists writing as external observers and Russian statesmen and intellectuals writing from the inside. From the period of the gathering of the lands and the concentration of power under the grand prince of Muscovy in the fifteenth century, economic life was severely restricted by climatic and geographic factors, short growing seasons, poor soil, extreme temperatures, a landlocked location, and the lack of easily accessible stone for building. Muscovy controlled the headwaters of great rivers—the Western Dvina, Dniepr, and Volga, but not their outlets in the Baltic, Black, and Cas-

pian seas. So the production of agricultural surpluses and international trade were inadequate to provide the foundations for a great power or even to mount a strong defense against external enemies. These conditions changed only slowly over time.

The acquisition of good arable land (the famous black earth, or *chernozem*), access to natural resources such as furs, gold, salt, and later coal and iron ore, and outlets to the inland seas were secured only in the course of several centuries of expansion and colonization: from Siberia and left-bank Ukraine in the seventeenth century to the conquest of the Baltic and Black seas littoral in the eighteenth century. But their exploitation was hampered by the means by which they were acquired. Only Siberia was an easy conquest. To the west and south, long and costly wars from the early sixteenth to the late eighteenth century were required to establish Russia as an imperial power of European rank. To extract the surpluses from its initially meager resource base, the state imposed heavy obligations on all strata of the population, organized as corporate estates (*soslovie*). Through state subsidies and outright ownership of factories it controlled the production of weapons and equipment for the army. From the time of Peter the Great military expenditures swallowed most of the budget. Resorting to these extreme administrative and fiscal measures, the Russian Empire succeeded in adapting to the gunpowder revolution of the sixteenth century and the military revolution of the seventeenth century. But it fell behind during the third, industrial revolution in technology and weaponry in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Despite renewed efforts to reform all the major institutions of Russian society to create a modern fiscal system and an army of citizens rather than serfs, imperial Russia in its late stages lost three out of four wars, something that had not happened since the seventeenth century. The drive to catch up with the West had become more urgent.

Russia's industrialization, however, was slowed by the absence of capital, the social conservatism of its merchantry, and the economic attachment of the peasant to the commune after the abolition of serfdom. Economic backwardness never translated into dependency on the West as it did with other Eurasian empires. But foreign loans, technology transfer, and patterns of trade did expose Russia to pressures from abroad that sparked nativist reaction and influenced the formation of alliances. During the First World War Russia's need for loans obliged the government to make concessions to foreigners that encroached upon its sovereignty. Thus, economic backwardness was the first legacy of the persistent factors inherited by the Bolsheviks.

Second, porous or vulnerable frontiers have existed since the formation of the Muscovite state in the late fifteenth century. For four centuries the frontiers were ill defined, unstable, underpopulated, and contested by rival multicultural states all along the state's extended periphery. From the sixteenth to the nineteenth century Russia and its imperial rivals—Sweden, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Ottoman, Safavid (Iranian), and Qing empires—engaged in a prolonged struggle over the borderlands. During the same period the steppe nomads resisted incorporation into the competing empires and remained a serious threat to stability along Russia's southern frontier into the eighteenth century.

By the end of the eighteenth century Russia had established its ascendancy over its long-standing continental competitors and subdued the steppe nomads. This was due in major part to the superiority of Russian arms achieved by introducing Western military techniques and imposing harsh measures to mobilize men and resources. But these efforts seriously distorted economic growth. Colonization also played a part in consolidating the borderlands despite the government's ambivalence in promoting it. The authorities perceived the advantages of populating the expanding margins of empire, yet they sought to prevent the illegal flight of peasants from the center and the formation of autonomous frontier communities such as the Cossack brotherhoods. Neither conquest nor colonization, however, guaranteed security on the frontiers. Having gained ascendancy over its imperial continental rivals, Russia faced a new set of external challenges in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

As early as the late eighteenth century the British began to perceive Russian overland expansion in Southeastern Europe and Central Asia as a potential threat to its possessions in India and its imperial sea lanes. The Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia, popularized by Kipling as "the Great Game," was only one sector in the long arc of an extended if a low-level competition that stretched along Russia's porous frontiers from the Balkans in the Ottoman Empire through the North Caucasus, Iran, Afghanistan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. The "first Cold War" between Britain and Russia erupted into an armed conflict only once, during the Crimean War. But several other collisions were narrowly averted. Even after the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907 partitioned Iran into spheres of influence, their rivalry continued unabated.

A second and more direct threat to Russian control over its borderlands came from two latecomers to imperialism, Germany and Japan. In both countries patriotic societies, military planners, and business interests saw opportunities to expand their influence and power along Russia's vulnerable frontiers.

After having defeated Russia in the 1904–1905 war, the Japanese Kwantung Army regarded Korea and Manchuria as stepping-stones to annexing the Russian maritime provinces, an aim they pursued vigorously during the period of civil war and intervention (1918–1922). Similarly, the German army during the First World War envisaged integrating parts of Russia's western borderlands into a greater Mitteleuropa, while granting the rest specious independence under German domination. Russia's defeat in the First World War and the intervention stripped Russia of its imperial borderlands and reduced the core to the frontiers of 1618. This was the second legacy of the persistent factors inherited by the Bolsheviks.

Third, with the conquest of the Muslim Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan in the sixteenth century, Russia became a multicultural state. As a result of further expansion, migration, and colonization, the Russian periphery acquired the characteristics of a "shatter zone," inhabited by a complex mix of ethnic groups, religions, and cultures. Imperial officials were neither systematic nor successful in their attempts to assimilate the borderlands by imposing either Orthodoxy or linguistic Russification on the non-Russian peoples. In some cases, such as that of Poland, they confronted the resistance of a people with a strong Catholic identity and a proud statist tradition of their own. In other cases, such as that of Finland and the Baltic provinces, a long association with Sweden and Protestantism had sunk deep roots that were difficult to extirpate. The Muslim peoples of the Volga, Siberia, the Caucasus and Central Asia and the large Jewish population brought into the empire through the partitions of Poland adhered stubbornly to the customs and beliefs of their corporate religious life. The nomadic populations resisted efforts to turn them into agriculturalists.

The borderlands were highly unstable regions, and the history of this multicultural empire is replete with rebellions. The most serious of these were those of the Cossacks throughout the seventeenth century; the Bashkirs, three times in the eighteenth century; and the Poles twice in the nineteenth century. It was difficult for the central government to control the movement of peoples on the periphery. Nomadic tribes crossing frontiers, runaway serfs, and religious dissenters fleeing persecution continually added to a large floating population on the frontiers outside government control. In the eyes of the ruling elite the loyalty of peoples in the "shatter zone" was always in question.

By the turn of the twentieth century, nationalist sentiment began to coalesce in the borderlands, spreading from small circles of intelligentsia to larger groups in the population and increasing concerns for stability among the leadership. In 1905 nationalism erupted with explosive force along the western and

southwestern periphery as a consequence of Russia's defeat in the war with Japan. Consequently, following the outbreak of the First World War, the Russian government and army command regarded certain ethnic groups such as the Jews and Germans as security risks and ordered their massive deportation from the western frontier provinces. The process of national awareness intensified during the civil war and intervention, when many nationalities sought to separate from the empire under foreign protection. It represented the third legacy with which the Bolsheviks had to deal.

Fourth, cultural alienation refers to an amalgam of geographical, political, and historical factors that have contributed to perceptions of Russia by natives and foreigners alike as a state and society engaged with but distinctive from Europe. Two centuries of Mongol rule, acceptance of Christianity from Byzantium rather than Rome, and sheer physical distance from the centers of European civilization have often been given as the reasons that Russia did not participate in the Renaissance, Reformation, and early stages of the rise of capitalism. These perceptions had practical consequences for Russia's belated entry and incomplete integration into the international system.

From the time of Ivan IV "the Terrible" until Peter the Great, Russia's rulers were unsuccessful in their efforts to gain European recognition as a full-fledged member of the Christian commonwealth. Ivan's conquest of the Muslim khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan turned the state into a multicultural empire. But the pope denied its imperial claims because the conquered lands were not recognized as belonging to the European state system. Its subsequent conquest of Siberia, inhabited mainly by nomadic peoples organized along tribal lines, reinforced the image of Russia in Europe as an Asian empire. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Russia was omitted from official registers of Christian states and celebrated peace plans for Europe like those of William Penn. It was ignored in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which laid the foundations of the European balance of power. Peter the Great and Catherine the Great expended great efforts to demonstrate that Russia was part of Europe in both a political and cultural sense. But neither they nor their successors were able to convince large segments of European opinion. Western observers such as the Marquis de Custine in the nineteenth century continued to explain Russia to Europe in much the same terms as foreign diplomats, soldiers of fortune, and merchants had done in previous centuries. The land was mysterious, exotic, "oriental," even a "rude and barbarous kingdom." Moreover, the work of the Marquis de Custine was hailed in the mid-twentieth century by such diplomats as George Kennan as a reliable guide to the contemporary Soviet Union.

Europeans often regarded Russian diplomatic practices as irregular or deceitful. In part this was the result of misunderstandings arising from Russia's need to conduct relations with societies possessing very different political cultures, ranging from nomadic empires and tribal confederations to imperial China and the European state system. In part, too, European chanceries misinterpreted the activities of Russian proconsuls, loose cannons in the distant reaches of empire, who ignored instructions from St. Petersburg in order to take advantage of local conditions or to advance their own careers. Many of these impressions had weakened but still lingered on the eve of World War I. It was the fourth legacy inherited by the Bolsheviks.

Although this chapter takes up each persistent factor separately, they have been closely related throughout Russian history. No single periodization can be applied to all of the factors, and the development of each may vary asynchronously with the others. Attempts to resolve problems arising from one such factor may set back efforts to solve problems related to others. For example, the defense of long-permeable borders might be strengthened by deportation of reputedly unreliable frontier people and their replacement by settlers from the interior—at least Stalin thought so. But his policy imposed heavy costs in terms of discrediting Soviet nationality policy and disrupting economic development on the periphery without resolving the problem of frontier security.

CONJUNCTURAL FACTORS FOR CHANGE

An interpretation of foreign policy that privileges continuity but rejects determinism needs to provide an explanation of the conditions under which change takes place. This chapter attributes change to two conjunctural factors, one external and one domestic: the international system and leadership. Persistent factors have a long time horizon; they make up the geographical and cultural dimensions of Russian foreign policy. Conjunctural factors have a shorter time span; they are the source of immediate and specific problems imposed from the outside and of the policies formulated and implemented by the domestic policy makers to solve those problems. The international system underwent more radical changes during the twentieth century than in any previous comparable period of time. During the transformation of the system and Russia's position within it, dramatic changes also took place in the quality and style of domestic leadership as well as the composition of the ruling elites.

During the twentieth century, the relative distribution of power among the major players, including Russia, shifted not only within Europe but also between Europe and extra-European powers. Three times, in 1917–1920, 1941–1943, and 1989–1991, the very existence of the Russian state stood in the balance. In the first half of the twentieth century the most significant change for Russia and the Soviet Union was the rise and expansion of the two flank powers, Germany and Japan. Late in shaping their national identities and in industrializing, they repeatedly challenged Russian and Soviet hegemony in the borderlands of Eastern Europe and Northwest Asia. A second no less decisive challenge was the sudden emergence of the United States as a world power in 1945 and its rapid assumption of the role played so long by the British Empire in challenging Russian influence along a wide arc from Turkey to Korea. Following the defeat of the flank powers and the decline of the traditional European powers, including France, this change introduced a bipolar world, a unique phenomenon in international politics.

The third transformation occurred when the Chinese Communists completed the reunification of China in 1949. By the 1960s they revived old border disputes between the two states and emerged as an unexpected rival of the Soviet Union within the international communist movement. The fourth transformation in the international system was the process of decolonization and the creation of scores of new sovereign states. Lacking well-developed administrative and economic infrastructures, often poverty-stricken, and governed by radical politicians or military dictators, they formed a new contested ground for the two dominant global powers. Added to this, the creation of nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery systems completely altered the strategic balance and constituted a fifth important shift in the international setting. Henceforth all frontiers were porous. By introducing the ultimate weapon, one that imposed the risk of mutual annihilation, the two powers locked themselves into a deeply dialectical relationship, marked by a profound and enduring rivalry but at the same time requiring significant cooperation in order to avoid Armageddon.

And the changes continued after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The emergence of the European Union as an economic superpower harnessed to a NATO alliance and steadily marching eastward confronted the new Russia with a prospect that has in the past represented the ultimate security nightmare—a frontier with a unified European “empire.” Finally, American triumphalism expanded the influence of the United States into regions of long-standing Russian interest all along its shrunken frontiers. Throughout these shifts, Soviet and post-Soviet

policy makers were forced to deal with circumstances that were beyond their immediate control and, in the process, to adjust their strategic posture.⁶ The question is, How deep were the adjustments and how lasting are they?

As for leadership, there were major changes in the basis of legitimacy and the social composition of the ruling elite following the two radical transformations of 1917 and 1991. After 1917 the tsarist ruling elite and the entire class from which it had been recruited were eliminated from political life. In the Stalinist purges the elite of the revolution was destroyed. Perestroika introduced a new generation of Soviet leaders prepared for extensive change. Since then there has been more continuity in the elites but sharply different leadership styles.

In this chapter leadership style signifies the mode of rhetorical expression, presentation of self, ideological pronouncements, and setting of strategic priorities. Styles were distinctive and in the case of Stalin monstrously so. But it should be kept in mind that up to the present all Soviet and post-Soviet leaders since Lenin's death have emerged from the same political milieu. Moreover, changes in style have often been more striking in appearance than in reality due to the tendency of successive leaders to discredit or denounce their predecessors, always excepting Lenin. The role of leadership has revolved around two basic issues: innovation versus continuity in tactics and strategy and passive versus active response to the challenge of the persistent factors.

Major policy innovations have been associated with the dominant personalities who succeeded Lenin. Yet in all cases the epigone laid claim to his legacy. Central as this was to legitimizing succession in the case of Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev, it was not without foundation in fact. Justification can be and was found in Lenin's thoughts and action for the concepts of socialism in one country and peaceful coexistence, the Brezhnev Doctrine, and perestroika. To be sure, the original versions of these ideas were modified to fit changes in the international environment, but they also should be viewed as a response to problems arising from the persistent factors. So should the policy departures of their post-Soviet successors, Yeltsin and Putin.

SETTING THE SOVIET STAGE

It is both an irony of Russian history and testimony to Lenin's political genius that the conjuncture of the Bolshevik seizure of power and the collapse of the

international system in 1917–1918 offered the best opportunity to resolve the major questions in Russian foreign policy arising from the persistent factors. The Bolsheviks' initial approach to foreign policy was to reject any links to the past and to deny that they were heirs to previous policies and traditions. Yet, their revolutionary stance and repudiation of historical continuity represented an attempt, however unintended, to transform the problems created by the persistent factors into advantageous conditions for the achievement of their original aims. First, they would seek to create a federation of soviet republics that, in Lenin's version, would be based on equal, voluntary, and open membership. Even Stalin supported the creation of multinational institutions at the republic and local levels. In both cases, the aim was to transform the nationalities problem that had persistently weakened the tsarist empire into a powerful force for unifying the state and attracting other countries to join it.

Second, the Bolsheviks would throw open the frontiers to two-way traffic, accepting revolutionary refugees from outside and dispatching revolutionary proconsuls in all directions, thus terminating the long-standing efforts of the tsarist government to seal Russia's porous frontiers that persistently sapped the internal resources of the state and exposed it to penetration by alien influences. Third, they would impose drastic, indeed unprecedented, controls over the economy that would enable them to mobilize, manage, and direct human and material resources to compensate for the economic backwardness that persistently hampered the vigorous and independent conduct of foreign policy. Fourth, by redefining Russia as the weakest link in the imperialist chain, they would claim to have initiated socialist revolutions in the advanced, industrialized countries of the West and at the same time to have inspired progressive anticolonial revolutions in the East, thus resolving both the internal conflicts over identity and external perceptions of strangeness that persistently contributed to Russia's cultural alienation. In sum, the original vision of Bolshevism projected on an international system shattered by four years of war and revolution would transcend the persistent problems by abolishing national frontiers and nation-states, opening the way for economic modernization through domestic planning and massive assistance from the proletariat of the advanced industrial countries undergoing their own revolutions inspired by Bolshevism, placing Russia at the center rather than at the margins of global societies and social change. But the apparent breakthrough failed to take place. The Bolsheviks lacked the necessary strength, and the European powers, having recovered their equilibrium, excluded them from the new international system. The transforming moment was over.

The Bolsheviks were forced to retreat from their utopian goals by foreign intervention, the outbreak of civil war, and the failure of revolution to secure a foothold beyond the borders of the former Russian Empire.⁷ They then faced the daunting prospect of constructing a state order and a foreign policy from an isolated, ruined country encircled by hostile forces ranged along disputed borders. More than one astute observer compared the situation with Russia's Time of Troubles in the early seventeenth century, when internal rebellions, external intervention (by Poles, Swedes, and Tatars) and "false pretenders" came close to destroying the state altogether.

By 1917 the war had seriously eroded the achievements of tsarist reformers such as Count S. Iu. Witte and P. I. Stolypin who had sought in the two preceding decades to reduce economic backwardness. The Bolsheviks inherited a wartime economy that had achieved remarkable results in a few sectors of industry but failed to solve the problem of food procurement and distribution. By the time of the February Revolution, administrative chaos more than shortfalls in productivity brought the regime to the brink of collapse.⁸ Russia's international debt had sharply increased, and further economic assistance from its Western allies came only at the high price of sacrificing some of its national sovereignty. The economic foundations of a great power had been destroyed. Strained by more than three years of war, industry collapsed, the working class melted away, and Russia suffered a demographic disaster. Losses among the general population to war, disease, and famine may have reached a total of eight million.⁹ The country was plunged into a state of primitive autarky. Deindustrialization and a collapse of the transportation system broke apart the urban-rural nexus. In the eyes of European statesmen, the Bolshevik government was virtually an international outlaw. The state-building potential of the alternative White governments was even less promising. They controlled the economically underdeveloped and multicultural borderlands contested by separatist movements, which strongly opposed the restoration of a Great Russian centralized state. The persistent factors cramped the Bolsheviks but crippled the Whites.

The need to survive forced the Bolsheviks to adopt a series of improvisations in domestic policy called war communism. These measures resembled some of Peter the Great's most stringent programs and foreshadowed those of Stalin. The Bolsheviks intensified and broadened the policies adopted by both the tsarist and provisional governments to extract resources by coercive means but gave preference to the industrial over the agricultural sector.¹⁰ Economic backwardness in the Soviet Union, however, posed more

serious problems for the Bolsheviks than it did for the statesmen of imperial Russia.

First, unlike the tsarist elites, the Soviet leadership unanimously, openly, and repeatedly declared its intention to catch up with the West and, for that purpose, supported a proindustrial developmental Weltanschauung. Second, the pattern of substitutions, in Alexander Gerschenkron's formulation, shifted: Among late industrializers in nineteenth-century Europe the state had taken over the guiding role played by industrial entrepreneurs in early capitalism; in the Soviet Union in the 1930s an administrative command economy was imposed by the Communist Party with initially very high levels of coercion.¹¹ Third, in the Soviet experience, the difference in both the supply and quality of domestically produced military and civilian goods increased to the point where the former achieved near parity with the West beginning with World War II, while the latter steadily fell behind in almost every category. In Vasilii Kliuchevskii's famous aphorism, "The state grew fat and the people lean." The Soviet leadership's determination to conduct the foreign policy of a great power and to serve as the model for building socialism was constructed on an inadequate economic base at the expense of impoverishing the population.

Moreover, in the separate peace negotiations between the fledgling Soviet republic and the Central Powers, ideology ran up against reality. The treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed with Germany in March 1918, was the first major decision taken by the Bolshevik leaders when elements of the persistent factors threatened to overwhelm them.¹² During and immediately after, Lenin drafted the main outlines of Soviet foreign policy with two guiding principles, both of which reflected the impact that the persistent factors had on him: first, to split the capitalist powers and the socialist parties of Europe.¹³ The immediate Bolshevik aim at Brest-Litovsk was to negotiate a separate peace with the Central Powers to secure the frontiers on the western and southern frontiers from further penetration even at the cost of surrendering the entire glacis of the non-Russian borderlands. Once this had been done, the Bolsheviks could build a new Red Army to defeat the Whites and separatist movements in the borderlands.

Second, by signing the treaty, Lenin sought to underscore Soviet Russia's commitment to the doctrine of self-determination. The object here was twofold: first, to win the support or at least the neutrality of peoples of the imperial borderlands by reassuring them that the Bolsheviks did not intend to reimpose the repressive tsarist policies toward the nationalities, what Lenin called "Great Russian chauvinism"; and second, to reserve the right for the center to decide

which movements for self-determination were in the interests of the new Soviet state. Although the treaties signed at Brest-Litovsk were abrogated by the defeat of Germany in the West, they left an enduring legacy. They laid the basis for the post-World War I independence of Finland, the Baltic republics, Ukraine, and the Caucasian republics. Although an independent Ukraine did not survive the civil war, after 1991 Ukrainian nationalists celebrated its brief existence as the symbolic foundation of the new state.

By creating a new, Third International in 1919, the Bolsheviks forced a split in the European socialist parties with two important implications for their foreign policy. First, they aimed to disrupt a common front of the European Left dominated by "revisionists," who regarded the Bolshevik revolution as a Russian distortion of Marxism and an alien intrusion into civilized Europe. Second, they created a unique instrument of foreign policy by subordinating the activities of foreign communist parties to the political control and interests of the Soviet state as the self-proclaimed base of world revolution.¹⁴ However, attempts by the Soviet leaders to manipulate the activities of the foreign parties whether through the Comintern (1919–1943), the Cominform (1948–1955), or some form of communist commonwealth were never entirely successful. Once in power, communists in Eastern Europe and China began to perceive the cultural distance that separated them from the Soviet Union. After 1917, the persistent problem of cultural alienation resurfaced in a new and unexpected form.

Soviet leaders perceived opportunities as well as dangers stemming from porous frontiers. If their frontiers were vulnerable to outside penetration because of the presence of a nationalist bourgeoisie in the borderlands and a petty bourgeois peasantry throughout the country, then frontiers of the capitalist West could also be penetrated by mobilizing its working class. On balance, however, the Bolsheviks' fears of foreign penetration took precedence over their hopes for revolution. Until and unless potential domestic enemies were eliminated, there was always the danger that they represented a reservoir of support for foreign intervention. This fear, fed by the memories of the civil war and intervention but exaggerated to pathological proportions under Stalin, helps to explain the war against the kulaks in the 1930s, the deportations before and during World War II, and the distrust of Russian Jews after the creation of the state of Israel. As had been the case under tsarist rule, porous frontiers running along the perimeter of multinational borderlands created problems that blurred the distinction between foreign and domestic policies.

The Soviet state had survived the civil war and intervention in a weakened condition and faced a barrage of problems in its relations with the external

world. The most pressing concerns were related to problems arising from the persistent factors. The first was to attract trade and investment without running the risk of capitalist restoration or "the enslavement of the Russian working people by foreign capital." This could be done by appealing to the commercial interests of the Entente powers, an idea that the foreign commissar, Georgii Chicherin, dubbed "one of the most outstanding in Lenin's foreign policy."¹⁵ The second was to stabilize the frontiers by reaching agreements with neighboring states. The third was to gain diplomatic recognition from the major powers and secure its status in the international community without, however, abandoning its long-term commitment to revolution. The fourth was to integrate the populations of the borderlands so as to disarm the local nationalists in both a political and cultural sense and to serve as a magnet for peoples across the frontier who belonged to the same ethnic group.

ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS: THE ROAD TO AUTARCHY AND BACK

My future is blank, but I feel
A longing to see beggared Russia
Become a Russia of steel

—Sergei Esenin, 1925

In the 1920s, foreign economic relations of the Soviet Union were shaped by a complex interplay among three factors: the international monetary system, domestic production for export, and the incompatibility of the capitalist and socialist systems. Attempts to attract foreign concessions and foreign loans, controversial as they were among the Soviet leaders, went nowhere. Although a decree on foreign concessions had been adopted in 1920, it never fulfilled its potential. This was due in large part to the difficulty of maintaining a stable currency based on gold, a problem that had existed throughout Russian history except for the two decades before the revolution.¹⁶ Another obstacle was the refusal of the Soviet government to repay debts incurred by the tsarist government and to compensate foreign owners for property confiscated during the revolution.

High hopes for foreign trade did not materialize despite Soviet willingness to sign agreements, such as the Anglo-Soviet trade treaty of 1921, which did not grant diplomatic recognition. Throughout the 1920s Soviet exports con-

tinued to depend on agricultural products and raw materials that were vulnerable to slumps in commodity prices, unfavorable harvests, and, more ominously from the government's perspective, difficulties in collecting grain from the peasantry. In the mid-1920s the value of foreign trade was equal to one half the 1913 level.¹⁷ If the export trade was quantitatively insignificant in the overall Soviet economy, it was necessary, nonetheless, in order to purchase vital machinery and equipment from abroad. But the party and state leaders were increasingly attracted to the ideas of self-sufficiency and industrialization. Commercial relations continued to be troubled by recurrent political differences with foreign powers, especially Great Britain and the United States, because of mutual suspicions and distrust. The Western powers were convinced that the main object of Soviet representatives abroad was to subvert the capitalist system. The Soviet leaders feared that foreign economic contacts, especially when linked to domestic bourgeois specialists, carried the germ of capitalist infection.¹⁸

The Soviet leadership expressed grave concern over the impact of economic backwardness on weapons technology and the preparedness of the armed forces. Like the epigone of Peter the Great, Lenin's successors were obliged to lift the crushing burden of military expenditures at the expense of weakening the army. Massive demobilization after the civil war cut the size of the Red Army from its peak of four and a half million to 560,000 in 1923. This figure amounted to one-third of the prewar standing army of Nicholas II. The Soviet military chiefs acknowledged that although their artillery was by this time a match for Poland's, it lagged far behind that of the "bourgeois states." The Soviet government was willing to take great risks to close the gap. It turned for assistance to the other loser at Versailles, Weimar Germany.

For a decade after the end of the civil war and intervention, the Reichswehr provided the Red Army with advanced military hardware and professional training. In exchange the Soviet Union helped the Germans to avoid the restrictive clauses of the Versailles Treaty by manufacturing and testing new weapons on Soviet territory. It is difficult to determine who gained the most from these dangerous deals. Russia had traditionally borrowed much of its military technology from the West, but never before had it gambled for such high stakes with a potential antagonist. The final reckoning came in World War II when the Soviet Union paid a fearful price for its assistance in building a modern German army. With the rise of Hitler to power in Germany, the Soviet leadership was determined to overcome its dependence on foreign weapons technology by constructing its own military-industrial complex.

In the great industrialization debates of the 1920s, different proposals advanced by Soviet leaders shared the imperative of overcoming economic backwardness. All had ramifications for Soviet foreign policy. In developing his ideas of economic autarky Stalin insisted that the country had to rely on its own resources, but he did not spell out how this was to be done. Evgeny Preobrazhenskii, a left-wing economist, was less inhibited, or less politically astute, in advocating a policy of squeezing surplus grain out of the peasantry at a time when the party was still hesitant to accept such a radical course. Nikolay Bukharin perceived the need for technological innovation and rationalization linked to international contacts. Leon Trotsky also favored the importation of high technology from Western Europe and the United States and even supported a policy of concessions to foreign capital to help develop the Soviet Union's natural resources.¹⁹ The growing sense of urgency over the need to industrialize was driven in part by foreign events, the break in diplomatic relations with Great Britain, and the war scare of 1926–1927.²⁰ But no single policy commanded unequivocal support.

At the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1926 a compromise was hammered out that endorsed a faster pace based on advanced technology, importation of sophisticated machinery, and expansion of foreign trade. But compromise was possible only so long as two conditions continued to prevail: first, that the economic infrastructure largely inherited from the past was capable of sustaining further growth without large-scale capital inputs and, second, that the Soviet Union would continue the process of integration into the international community. Neither condition held firm. By the late 1920s the legacy of economic backwardness began to produce bottlenecks that jeopardized further development, increasing the perception of the country's cultural alienation rather than diminishing it, as had been the case a few years earlier.

On the eve of the First Five-Year Plan, industrial capacity and technical infrastructure did not differ much from the situation in 1913. According to R. W. Davies, the Soviet leadership faced a stark choice: either squeeze the peasant or "open the geographical and ideological frontiers to foreign specialists, foreign investment, technology transfer and trade."²¹ Both courses carried high risks for the stability of the Soviet system.

In the Second Five-Year Plan, the linkage between industrialization and defense grew stronger. Once the industrial infrastructure had been created, the military sector steadily increased its share of investment, highly trained technical cadres, and transfer of foreign technology—a trend that continued throughout the Soviet period.²² As a result, relative economic backwardness, always an

uneven phenomenon, grew in the area of consumer goods and housing while it had virtually disappeared in the production of military hardware. The outbreak of war merely intensified this trend. The expansion of arms production to full capacity was nearly completed by the end of 1942, demonstrating how extensive the prewar planning had been. A combination of supercentralization, heroic improvisation, and mobilization of the scientific as well as technical intelligentsia enabled the Soviet economy to recover in part from the initial catastrophic losses of men, material, and productive capacity. Nevertheless, even in certain sectors of military hardware the Soviet Union still lagged behind Germany, Britain, and the United States and depended upon foreign technology to close the gap. For example, the Lend-Lease Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1941, provided the trucks, jeeps, and radio equipment that made possible a rapid advance of the Red Army after the great defensive victories at Stalingrad and Kursk won by arms and armaments produced in the Soviet Union.²³

The Pyrrhic victory over Nazi Germany and the short campaign against Japan vaulted the Soviet Union into the ranks of the superpowers, but they also intensified the problem of relative backwardness. Stalin estimated that the enormous war losses in productive potential were equivalent to two five-year plans. The demographic disaster caused by the deaths of twenty-eight million Soviet citizens and an estimated shortfall in births of eleven million was too shattering to be revealed for more than forty years. The psychological devastation was incalculable. The Soviet Union's attempt to recover drew upon three sources: the mobilization of domestic resources, including millions of demobilized soldiers; the stripping of industrial plants located in the occupied territories in the Soviet zone of East Germany, Manchuria, and Romania; and the acquisition of foreign economic assistance, mainly in the form of credits.

Despite the terrible destructiveness of the war, the Soviet Union no longer felt the same pressure to obtain foreign aid that had complicated its foreign policy in the prewar period. Still, its economic recovery could have been speeded up through the purchase of advanced technology from abroad with the assistance of low-cost foreign loans. The problem was the persistent one of a political trade-off. Moscow interpreted the abrupt U.S. cancellation of Lend-Lease as an unfriendly act. It appeared to presage the use of economic weapons to extract political concessions. The impression was reinforced by the failed negotiations with the United States over a postwar loan, and confirmed in Stalin's eyes by the U.S. conditions for participation in the Marshall Plan.²⁴ In the event, the United States' dollar diplomacy, designed to take advantage of Soviet

economic backwardness, proved as unsuccessful as its atomic diplomacy. Both tactics contributed to a policy of autarchy in reconstructing the Soviet economy, intensifying its campaign to catch up with and surpass the United States, and developing its own atomic and nuclear weaponry.

In the post-Stalinist era, the Soviet leadership periodically undertook reforms to repair the obvious shortcomings of the state economy. These included Khrushchev's orgy of administrative reorganization, Brezhnev's timid tinkering, and Gorbachev's more radical reorganization of the foundation blocks of Soviet institutions.²⁵ All labored under widespread economic and cultural restraints. Under Khrushchev, the drive to overcome economic backwardness coincided with a more adventurous foreign policy. His aim was to achieve superpower equality with the United States as the prerequisite to resolving all outstanding differences. What amounted to *Primat Ausenpolitik* in budget allocations created serious infrastructural problems, primarily in agriculture, and resulted in a persistent lag in the standard of living of the average Soviet citizen compared with those in the industrialized West. By the mid-1970s the growth rate of the Soviet economy turned down sharply and "the process of catching up came to an abrupt end."²⁶

The slowdown coincided with structural changes in the global economy that once again forced the Soviet leadership to confront the problem of relative backwardness in their relations with countries in the developing world. By the mid-1970s, Soviet industrial goods and technology no longer satisfied the needs of developing countries. In light of its growing technological lag, the Soviet Union had to embark on a program of modernization with the West and reassess the mechanical application of the Soviet model in overcoming backwardness in the postcolonial world. This process opened a gap between the kinds of technology the Soviet Union could provide and what the radical movements in Asia and Africa needed.²⁷

At the same time, the Soviet Union sought to compensate for its declining economic influence through a massive increase in arms exports, the one area where the persistent asymmetry of Soviet economic development continued to make it competitive on a world scale.²⁸ But this in turn created tensions with the West, especially the United States, its putative partner in arms control and détente. The Soviet foreign policy elite began to express doubts about the correlation-of-forces theory not only with respect to the efficacy of national liberation movements, but also from the perspective of foreign military assistance.²⁹ The conjuncture of concerns over these two aspects of the persistent factors foreshadowed Gorbachev's "new thinking," stressing less the "correla-

tion of forces" and focusing more on common ethical norms and economic interdependence in an integrated world.³⁰

Persistent attempts by Soviet leaders to overcome the debilitating effects of economic backwardness on foreign policy repeatedly ran into the same problem: how to preserve the Soviet system yet overcome long-standing structural weaknesses. All of the economic reforms rested on a number of cultural assumptions. First, according to the "campaign mentality" generated by the civil war, codified by Stalin, and followed by his successors (including Gorbachev), fundamental problems could be resolved by concentrating resources and propaganda on a single sector to achieve a breakthrough. In every case, this meant creating new or reorganizing existing bureaucracies with all the concomitant waste and confusion. In agriculture, the abolition of private landowning through Stalin's collectivization (admittedly more of a political than an economic measure) and Khrushchev's virgin soil program were the most egregious examples. But even under the conservative Brezhnev, the massive injection of capital into the countryside without establishing priorities or coordinating among different sectors backfired. Second, the state discouraged or penalized initiative and innovation at the local level. The expulsion of the "kulaks" was only the most spectacular of such measures. Khrushchev curtailed the collective farmers' right to use their private plots for growing produce. Under Brezhnev, enterprising collective farm managers were punished rather than rewarded.³¹ With no opportunities for fresh talents to make improvements and in the absence of the amenities of modern life, the most enterprising peasants began to leave the land. The massive outflow of labor that began in the early 1970s continues today, leaving the countryside even more backward and impoverished.

To address this shortfall, the Soviet Union had to import grain, making it vulnerable to economic pressure from abroad. Starting in the early 1970s the United States attempted to link trade and Soviet political behavior—with mixed results. There were indications that what some Western observers called the "tactic of positive linkage" moderated Soviet policy toward Jewish emigration and more generally in the Middle East. But by the 1980s, it also created a backlash among the Soviet leadership. In dealing with national security along Soviet frontiers, as in Afghanistan and Poland, the Soviet leaders reacted to Western economic pressure by rejecting positive linkage. Since the 1930s the Soviet leaders had feared that relying on foreign trade to overcome domestic shortcomings could lead to further compromises and concessions in the area of security.³² The same concerns surfaced in connection with technology transfer as a means

of overcoming economic backwardness. The governing elites split over the desirability of continuing to rely on foreign trade and technology transfer to solve domestic problems.³³ In this respect the dilemma and ensuing internal debates parallel the controversy over the Witte system in late imperial Russia.

Although foreign critics had long maintained that the Soviet system had failed to overcome its relative economic backwardness, it was left to the Soviet economists during the era of glasnost to reveal the severity of the lag and the desperate need for reform.³⁴ Early in this period, Gorbachev made clear that his main aim was "the removal of everything that hampered development." He emphasized "the necessity for far-reaching change and reorganization (*preobrazovanie*), to create a high-quality society" in every sense of the word. Above all, this meant a scientific-technological renewal of production and "attain[ment] of a high world level of productive labor."³⁵ By 1988 Gorbachev had come to realize that the achievement of this goal would be out of reach as long as military expenditures remained the top priority (amounting by his estimate to two and a half times that of the United States), thus continuing to hamper research and development and distorting the economic development of the civilian sector. This meant "an ideologically conscious retreat from orthodox class theory and methodology in analyzing international relations and so in formulating our foreign policy."³⁶

In the post-Soviet period the Russian leadership continued to search for a policy that would promote the integration of the Russian economy into the global economy but protect the commanding heights of the economy against foreign control. Under Yeltsin, market reformers were disappointed by the lack of real economic assistance from the West. The statist viewed radical reform as a loss of control over the levers of power.³⁷ The tug of war between the two generated a series of hesitant, confused, and inconsistent economic policies. The result was a deepening domestic crisis that widened the gap between the Russian and Western economies.³⁸ Throughout the decade of the 1990s Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) fell in real terms almost every year, ending up at 57 percent of what it had been in 1990. The decline was sharper in the twenty-one republics than in the predominantly Russian center. Within the republics the non-Russian population suffered from higher levels of poverty and unemployment than the Russians. All this contributed to a rise in ethnic tensions.³⁹

President Vladimir Putin's formula for catching up with the West is to impose state control over the ownership and management of mineral resources as a means to enter the global market economy. This is to be accomplished by cre-

ating "vertically integrated financial-industrial corporations capable of competing with Western multi-nationals." Cracking, down on errant oligarchs, building pipelines to enhance Russia's geopolitical interests, striking deals with European firms that give Russia 51 percent control, and raising gas and oil prices in neighboring states (Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova) to world market levels are so many aspects of his foreign economic policy.⁴⁰ The strong state sector of the economy and controlled market mechanisms in domestic and foreign trade appears to be a variation on policies first introduced by tsarist finance ministers such as Mikhail Reiter and Sergei Witte, and subsequently proposed by Bolsheviks such as Trotsky, Bukharin, Krassin, and others in the 1920s but never fully implemented.⁴¹ The use of mineral resources as a basis for the restitution of Russia as a great power requires a delicate calibration to succeed. Its overly zealous implementation runs the risk of tilting heavily toward the statist side, scaring off Western investors and alienating Western governments.⁴² A crucial obstacle to Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization was long Putin's concern that the establishment of directly owned local branches of foreign banks would not allow Russia to control flows of capital in and out of the country.⁴³ This is another example of the recurrent contradiction between overcoming economic backwardness and defending porous frontiers.

Although the Russian economy is recovering from the wild 1990s, culminating in the crisis of 1998 when the Russian government defaulted on its foreign debt, it ranks only sixty-third in the world on the scale of "competitive ability outlook." Still reeling from the distorting effects of deindustrialization, Russia remains overly dependent on the export of raw materials, primarily oil and gas. The change in Russia's political system has aggravated the lag between research and development in the technology sector, while a brain drain has further reduced the pool of talent necessary for innovation. In 2003 only 3 to 5 percent of Russian products were competitive in the markets of industrial nations, and only 25 percent of Russian technological products met world standards.⁴⁴ These sober conclusions underline Russia's dilemma in having to choose yet again between full integration into the international economic system and movement toward greater autarky. Under Putin's administration, there have been moves in both directions. But in both cases, the tendency of the economic oligarchs to accumulate, rather than reinvest, their profits has strengthened the state's role in the economy. It is still a matter of debate whether Russia's decision to eliminate gas subsidies to members of the Commonwealth of Independent States and ban Georgian wines is part of an effort to exert political pressure or an economic necessity.⁴⁵

POROUS FRONTIERS: SEALING, EXPANDING AND CONTRACTING

A great new age is born

Have faith in it! Receive it from our hands!

Both ours and yours, it will efface all boundaries

—Ilya Ehrenburg, 1920

The problems that permeable frontiers posed for Soviet foreign policy were partly inherited from the prerevolutionary period and partly the making of the new regime. The most serious of these, common to both eras, were encirclement, penetration, and flight. One of the first tasks facing the Soviet Commissariat of Foreign Affairs was to seal the borders of the new state against a possible renewal of intervention from bases in neighboring countries. Foreign troops had penetrated the space of the old empire from multiple points along its periphery from Finland to the maritime provinces. For the Bolsheviks the pressing need was to establish diplomatic relations with the smaller states that might serve as staging grounds for future interventions. Between 1920 and 1921 the Soviet government signed treaties with Estonia, Latvia, Finland, Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, Mongolia, and, following a brief war, Poland. Yet almost at once the hope faded that these measures would blunt the efforts of émigré groups and the more powerful states of the Entente from using these countries as springboards for future intervention. In December 1921 Poland, quietly encouraged by France, took the lead in forging a mutual assistance pact with Finland, Estonia, and Latvia. To Stalin this was an additional sign that neither commercial nor diplomatic agreements with foreign states were reliable guarantees of state security. Rather, in his words, they opened Soviet borders to “spies of the world bourgeoisie,” who were also busy in Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and the Far East building “an economic (and not only economic) fence” around the Soviet Union.⁴⁶

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks were constructing their own metaphorical fence along the inner perimeter of the country. Its purpose was to stem the outflow of people and the importation of ideas. There had been precedents throughout Russian history. Before Peter I, travel abroad was made very difficult. Following a relatively open period in the eighteenth century, Russian rulers reacted strongly to revolutionary events abroad in 1789 and 1848. Paul forbade students from attending foreign universities and Nicholas I imposed strict regulations on young people studying abroad.⁴⁷ Russian university curricula were purged of

courses dealing with European constitutionalism. The importation of books from the West was subjected to severe censorship.⁴⁸ Yet at the same time Russian engineers were sent to the United States to study railroad construction and French engineers were recruited to teach in St. Petersburg and supervise public works projects, including the construction of railroads. From Peter the Great to Gorbachev there were persistent attempts to promote economic development and technology transfer without opening the frontiers to subversive political ideas or direct foreign influence. To acknowledge economic backwardness and simultaneously to claim some kind of spiritual or ideological superiority reproduced the dilemma faced by tsarist bureaucrats in the nineteenth century.

In the early years of the revolution the Bolshevik frontier policy was inspired briefly by the idea of proletarian internationalism. The borders were thrown open to supporters of the revolution, and revolutionary proconsuls fanned out from Germany to China. In-migration brought hundreds of intellectual sympathizers and thousands of foreigners seeking jobs.⁴⁹ War-torn Russia's need for skilled workers and agriculturalists complemented Bolshevik ideology. In the 1920s the government also attempted to woo back rank-and-file participants in the civil war who had fled for their safety by offering them amnesty. The objective was to weaken anti-Soviet organizations abroad. But in seeking to make open frontiers work to their advantage, the Bolsheviks were unable to reconcile proletarian internationalism with the need for state security. Contradictions multiplied over practical issues, such as settling the emigrants, incorporating them into the economy, and granting them citizenship. Soviet attitudes toward migrants eventually shifted as the prospects for the spread of revolution diminished and Stalin's ideological linkage between capitalist encirclement and socialism in one country reinforced the importance of secure borders.

As early as May 1918, concern over the implications of Russia's open frontiers had prompted Lenin to approve the formation of a special border guard, which in 1920 was reorganized into the internal security forces. One of its initial tasks, to prevent illegal emigration, was marked by failure. One and a half million people passed into exile, draining the country of much irreplaceable talent.⁴⁹ Over the following two decades the border guard, recruited selectively and paid well, developed into an elite unit. The annexations of 1939–1940 created a new western frontier, with territories that included Western Galicia, which had never been part of the Russian Empire, and territories such as Karelia, the Baltic states, and Bessarabia, where substantial parts of the population were of dubious loyalty. In 1939 the growing tension along the western frontier

caused by German pressure on Poland and Romania prompted the Soviet government to undertake a major reorganization of the border guards, to increase their number to 158,000, and to renew emphasis on the importance of ideology in their training.⁵⁰

In the 1920s Stalin introduced three ideological proposals aimed at strengthening frontier defenses that marked a further shift away from international revolution to territorial expansion as the basic goal of Soviet foreign policy. First, he asserted that contrary to the internationalist viewpoint Soviet Russia would be "transformed in the course of building socialism into a base for the further unfolding of the world revolution, into a lever for the further disintegration of imperialism."⁵¹ Second, in giving overwhelming priority to strengthening the Soviet state as a prerequisite for spreading world revolution, Stalin took the final, decisive step in imposing upon foreign communist parties a primary obligation to defend the Soviet state, even if this meant sacrificing their own revolutionary prospects in the short term. Third, Stalin declared that though the Soviet Union could build socialism it could not guarantee immunity against the dangers of "intervention and consequently against a restoration of the bourgeois order without the victory of the revolution in at least a number of countries."⁵² He did not specify which countries or how the revolution would be carried out, implicitly leaving the choice of ends and means in his hands. By giving the Soviet state preeminence in creating the external conditions for building socialism, he set the stage for a new relationship with the external world. He opened the way for the possibility of signing of nonaggression pacts and even treaties of alliance between the Soviet Union and imperialist powers.

To secure the frontiers during the turmoil of the five-year plans, Stalin continued to pursue the traditional policy of keeping Russia's potential enemies divided at a time of domestic crisis. The foreign policy of the state represented one arm and the Comintern the other arm of that policy. When the threat from German fascism and Japanese militarism appeared greatest, the Soviet government supported collective security, entered the League of Nations (that "den of imperialists") in 1934, signed treaties of alliance with Czechoslovakia and France in 1935, and negotiated seriously with France and Britain into the summer of 1939 for a pact of mutual assistance. But the exclusion of the Soviet Union from the four-power negotiations that led to the Munich Pact in 1938 raised the ancient specter of Russia's isolation. Stalin turned toward the alternative option of reaching agreements with Germany and Japan in order to avoid the nightmare of fighting a war on two fronts separated by thousands of miles without substantial aid from the West.

Toward the same end the Soviet Union orchestrated Comintern activities in Spain and China to keep Germany and Japan engaged in conflicts far removed from Soviet frontiers. In addition, Soviet diplomats sought to gain international support from the Western democracies. But the deeper the Comintern and the Soviet Union became involved in supplying military aid and volunteers to Spain and China, the more the Western democracies feared that encouraging antifascist activities would fulfill Stalin's prediction of "the victory of the revolution in at least a number of other countries."⁵³

Stalin's decision to sign a pact with Hitler may have shocked the communist faithful outside the Soviet Union, not to mention noncommunists, but it was not fundamentally different from Russia's traditional approach to challenges on its western frontiers. Many called the Nazi-Soviet pact "the fourth partition of Poland," echoing the three-stage partition of Poland in the eighteenth century. It was that, but something more as well. It delineated spheres of influence all along the western perimeter of the Soviet Union, and it represented an approximate restoration of the old tsarist frontier. Would an agreement with France and Britain have provided the same guarantees? Quite possibly, although the outcome might have been more similar to what happened after World War II. In the negotiations with the French and British in the summer of 1939 Stalin had sought access rights for the Red Army in Poland and Romania.⁵⁴ He also insisted that any treaty guarantee the Soviet Union against "indirect aggression" launched from the Baltic states. One could easily imagine, in the event of a coalition war to check Nazi aggression, that these arrangements would have led to Soviet-inspired political changes in the countries "hosting" the Red Army as they did after 1945.

Moreover, the results in either case represented another in a series of Russian war aims (or frontier rectification, to use Stalin's preferred phrase) stretching back to the secret treaty of Rome in 1915, the Vienna settlement following the Napoleonic Wars, Elizaveta Petrovna's plans to crush Prussia during the Seven Years War against Frederick the Great, and Peter the Great's attempt to break down the "barrier states" in the early eighteenth century—to go back no further in time. In other words, the Soviet leaders shared with their predecessors (and with their successors) the belief that the porous western frontiers presented the most serious threat to the security of the state. Yet there seemed to be no permanent solution to this persistent problem, the reasons for which are discussed in the next section on the multinational character of the Soviet state.

Until very late in the Second World War, Stalin aimed at a restoration of the territories seized under the Nazi-Soviet pact with some strategic modifications.

These included obtaining bases in Finland, annexing the northern half of East Prussia and Sub-Carpatho Ukraine, securing economic and military concessions in Manchuria, and occupying North Korea. There is no evidence that he foresaw any immediate radical socioeconomic transformation of the "liberalized" countries of Eastern Europe.⁵⁵ In the postwar years no master plan emerged. Rather a combination of internal struggles for power, Western political intervention, and Soviet manipulation of armistice agreements created opportunities for local communists to turn their countries into "popular democracies" as adumbrated by Stalin in the 1930s.⁵⁶ At the same time Stalin sought to create spheres of influence along the southern frontier of the Soviet Union. His prime aims were to prevent British and American penetration of frontier areas in Iran and China, weaken Chinese control over Xinjiang and Manchuria, and obtain Nationalist China's recognition of independence for Outer Mongolia.⁵⁷ But he did not foresee a communist revolution in China and was surprised at its success. The postwar formation of a territorial belt of "friendly countries" on the Soviet periphery did not solve the problem of its permeable frontiers. On the contrary it worsened the problem by increasing the porousness of the empire's outer limits.⁵⁸

During the Cold War, new challenges to the security of Soviet frontiers emerged in a number of areas: economic, military, ideological, and technological. They originated both outside and within the Soviet bloc. In the negotiations preceding the adoption of the Marshall Plan, Stalin displayed his renewed concern over the vulnerability of the Soviet Union to capitalist penetration. In Paris in July 1947 a high-powered Soviet delegation led by Molotov attended the economic discussions among the European powers. But it soon became clear that economic cooperation would mean economic coordination. Soviet planning would have to be subordinated to a European plan. Stalin quickly concluded that this was "a scheme to organize a Western bloc against the USSR." He gave orders to the governments of Eastern Europe not to participate.⁵⁹

The U.S. policy of containment posed even greater problems. In 1949 the Western European states under U.S. leadership signed an unprecedented peacetime military alliance. Although defensive in character, NATO was routinely denounced by the Soviet Union as aggressive and anti-Soviet in its aims. The United States extended its ring of alliances to include a treaty with Japan, the Baghdad Pact, and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in South-east Asia. The latter two were short-lived but no less threatening in Soviet eyes. The permanent presence of American air bases and ground forces stationed

around the outer perimeter of the Soviet Union gave a wholly new meaning to capitalist encirclement. The problem for the Soviet leadership then became how to break the ring or vault over it.

Only after West Germany joined NATO did the Soviet Union react in kind by organizing the Warsaw Pact in 1955. Although article 8 required members to respect the independence and sovereignty of other members and practice nonintervention in their internal affairs, there was an ambiguity about the precise limitations this placed on joint action by members of the pact in order to maintain its unity. The Soviet leadership repeatedly attempted to resolve the ambiguity by linking intervention to an appeal from a group of local communists. In this way the operation would have the appearance of supporting the "legitimate" representatives of the socialist state against its internal enemies. As Stalin had learned in the break with Tito, it was not enough to have a communist party in power to guarantee Soviet predominance. What was needed was "a Russian party," as it had been known at times during the tsarist period, for example, in the case of relations with Poland and the Kazakh nomads in the eighteenth century or with Iran in the nineteenth century. Lacking any internal support in Yugoslavia, Stalin could "snap his little finger" all he wanted, but when no Yugoslavs responded, he chose not to intervene.⁶⁰ In the post-Stalinist period the Soviet leadership generally opted to intervene, despite initial hesitations and even disagreements, rather than accept the defection of a communist regime on its borders. In the case of Poland in 1956 and again in 1980 they took a chance in allowing the local party leadership to restore order rather than risk triggering a national uprising by sending in Soviet troops.

The Soviet decision to intervene in Afghanistan in 1979 differed only in details from the general pattern. During the civil war and intervention and into the 1930s Afghanistan had been a sanctuary for Turkmen resistance fighters (called Basmachi or bandits by the Bolsheviks) opposing the Soviet reconquest of Central Asia. A low-keyed British-Soviet competition for influence gave way in the 1950s to a more intense competition between the United States and the USSR. Soviet involvement suddenly increased following the establishment of a pro-Soviet government in April 1978 and the outbreak of a rebellion against it at a time when the Iranian revolution threatened great instability in the region. Although Afghanistan was not part of the Soviet alliance system, its strategic location, the danger that the Afghan communists would be overthrown by Muslim radicals to the benefit of the Americans, and memories of the trans-border Basmachi revolt combined to draw a reluctant Soviet leadership into an

armed intervention.⁶¹ The occupation of Afghanistan was never completed, and a new frontier with Pakistan opened. It was another case of attempting to close a porous Soviet frontier by territorial expansion that ended by creating another frontier even more difficult to seal.

Earlier, by moving the western border of its political dominion to the Stettin-Trieste line, the Soviet Union established a frontier that in the long run proved fatefully permeable. The United States was able to exploit social and economic problems in the East European communist bloc to create difficulties for the Soviet leadership. In the early years of the Cold War, both U.S. threats to destabilize Eastern Europe and the East German refugee crisis spread apprehension in Moscow. The Kersten Amendment to the Mutual Security Act, passed in the summer of 1951, authorized \$100 million for inciting insurgency in Eastern Europe, prompting a strong Soviet protest against subversion as a violation of the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreements that preceded U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933.⁶²

Responding to economic crisis and the lure of the West, a mass exodus of Germans—one hundred thousand in March 1952 alone—threatened the stability of the Communist regime. A more porous frontier could not be imagined, and Stalin recognized that the danger was not confined to East Germany. Writing to the East German communists in April 1952, he noted that the division of Germany had created “a dangerous frontier” between the two blocs. “One must strengthen the protection of this frontier,” the Soviet leader concluded.⁶³ Attempts to stem the tide were only temporarily effective. From January 1951 through April 1953, 447,000 people fled to West Germany.⁶⁴ Following the 1956 Hungarian revolution, 175,000 refugees crossed into Austria and another 20,000 fled to Yugoslavia, most of them young and well educated.⁶⁵ In 1961 another large wave of East Germans prompted the Communist leader Walter Ulbricht to write Moscow: “If the present situation of open borders remains, collapse is inevitable.”⁶⁶ The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 was an admission that only a physical barrier could seal the most permeable land frontier of the expanded Soviet system.

The final, fatal breach in the extended frontiers of the Soviet bloc was made by the decision of the Hungarian government in September 1989 to open their borders with Austria to the citizens of the GDR. Within a few weeks tens of thousands of Germans crossed into the Federal Republic by this route, putting pressure on the Czech government to follow suit.⁶⁷ The GDR could no longer resist the demands of its own population to travel freely, and gave up its efforts to defend the Berlin Wall. Earlier the same year Soviet forces completed their

withdrawal from Afghanistan after ten years of costly and futile efforts to close the porous frontier with Central Asia. It was all part of the great retreat.

Gorbachev's decision to renounce force in maintaining the outer perimeter of Soviet power abandoned a basic principle of Soviet foreign policy since 1945. Pulling back the Soviet political frontier to the 1945 territorial boundary was not, however, the end of the great retreat. In the end Gorbachev also chose not to use force to prevent the inner borderlands from breaking loose—first the Baltic states and then the rest of the western Caucasian and Transcaucasian republics. The western frontiers now bore a striking resemblance to those dictated at Brest-Litovsk. Gorbachev did not plan on this outcome, but at each moment of choice he opted for the solution that would end cultural alienation, enhance Soviet integration into the world community, reduce the economic burden of the arms race, and open the way for economic development and technological transfer by achieving partnership with the advanced Western states. Transcending the persistent factors is what the “new thinking” was all about.

The ideological penetration of Soviet frontiers came from within the socialist camp as well as from the capitalist world. Stalin himself was partially responsible for the problems. By preaching socialism in one country Stalin had been the first prophet of national communism. By dissolving the Comintern in 1943 he had opened “separate roads to socialism.”⁶⁸ Tito was the first to take one, but not by departing from Stalinism, which he continued to follow for several years after the Yugoslav-Soviet break in 1948. Rather his break with the Soviet Union was the result of his ambition to become the Stalin of the Balkans.

Mao Zedong was already moving along his own path before the Chinese Communists took power in 1949, and he and his successors continued to do so after Stalin's death.⁶⁹ Others followed. From the death of Stalin to the collapse of communism, every socialist state in Eastern Europe plus China engaged in a major conflict with the Soviet Union that ended in violent repression, an armed clash, or an outright break with the international communist movement.

Porous frontiers joined cultural alienation as the two sources of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Both had deep historical roots. The origins of their border disputes go back to the Muscovite-Ming period and evolved into a full-blown competition during the great expansion of the Qing dynasty into Central Eurasia during the eighteenth century.⁷⁰ Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, as Qing power declined, Russian penetration into the northern

tier of China—Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria—set precedents that would haunt the relationship between the Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes. Mao resented Stalin's policies of independence for Outer Mongolia, Soviet bases in Manchuria, and economic penetration of Xinjiang. Although Khrushchev pulled back from Xinjiang and Manchuria, the Chinese began in 1959 to reopen the entire border question by denouncing Russia's unequal treaties with China, imposed centuries earlier.⁷¹

Border incidents multiplied and tension mounted, reaching a peak in 1969 with large border clashes. By the early 1970s there were more Soviet divisions along the Chinese frontier than in Central Europe, and the Chinese deployed the bulk of their small nuclear strike force in the northeast, aimed at Soviet targets.⁷² The dissolution of the USSR weakened Russia's bargaining position and increased the pressure to reach economic agreements with China. In another trade-off between the demands of persistent factors, the Russians signed a border agreement in 1991 that was disadvantageous for them but cleared the way for the sale of arms to China. Russia accounted for 91 percent of China's arms imports in the period from 1993 to 2002.⁷³ However serious, the border dispute was also symptomatic of a deeper cultural divide between the two erstwhile allies, a point discussed in the section on cultural alienation.⁷⁴

In Eastern Europe the Soviet attempt to seal the USSR's porous frontiers by constructing a protective glacis of "fraternal countries" crumbled under the dual impact of Marxist revisionism and nationalism. In all the major crises that rocked the bloc, ideological deviation from the Soviet model was backed by the joint action of intellectuals and workers, who in theory constituted the social base for building socialism. This was true in the Berlin insurrection of 1953, the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968, and the Solidarity movement in Poland in the early 1980s.

A second common aspect linking these events was the "spillover effect." The problems facing Soviet leaders attempting to deal with insurrections within the bloc were similar in two respects to those faced by their imperial predecessors within the empire. First, there was the danger that uprisings in the borderlands could lead to foreign intervention. Second, there was the concern that an uprising in any one of the borderlands could touch off similar outbreaks in others. There is good evidence that these considerations played a crucial role in the decision of the Soviet leaders to intervene in Hungary in 1956. Similarly, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 was related in part to fears that the Ukrainian population of eastern Slovakia could serve as a conduit for the ideas

of the Prague Spring into the Soviet Ukraine.⁷⁵ In the wake of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, Leonid Brezhnev made explicit an unspoken assumption underlying Soviet foreign policy in the bloc:

When internal and external forces hostile to socialism seek to reverse the development of any socialist country whatsoever in the direction of the restoration of the capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of socialism arises in that country, a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole—this not only becomes a problem of the country concerned, but also a common problem and concern of all socialist countries.⁷⁶

It is illuminating to compare this statement with the justification offered by Nicholas I in 1849 for his decision to order Russian forces to suppress the Hungarian revolution against Habsburg rule.

As in the past I foresee only envy, malice and ingratitude [on the part of the Habsburg Monarchy] and probably would not intervene if the shirt was not so close to my body, that is if I did not see in [Polish General Józef] Bem and other scoundrels in Hungary not only enemies of Austria, but enemies of universal tranquility and order . . . that would destroy our tranquility.⁷⁷

One of the landmarks of Gorbachev's foreign policy was to repudiate the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine by invoking the new ideal of a "common European home," a bid to end the cultural alienation of the USSR.⁷⁸ But there was a trade-off. After 1989 local communist leaders could no longer count on Soviet support against popular uprisings. This was a decisive step toward the disintegration of the protective band of territories along the western Soviet frontier.

The changes in leadership after Stalin's death and the momentum of decolonization in the third world created new possibilities for the Soviet Union to attack the problem of encirclement by vaulting over the alliance system that the United States had erected around the bloc. Khrushchev claimed and many Western observers agreed that his policy of supporting national liberation movements was a return to Leninist principles and a rejection of Stalin and Zhdanov's "two-camp doctrine." It proved to be something more and something less. It was a fusion of both with an admixture of Khrushchev's own views. Khrushchev launched his new policy at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956,

stressing the need to establish friendly ties with "peace-loving states," while at the same time promoting peaceful coexistence with the imperialists. What had changed since Lenin's day, he argued, was that war was no longer inevitable due to changes in the international system.⁷⁹ For the next ten years Soviet diplomatic and military support went exclusively to established sovereign states, not revolutionary movements. In other words, the leapfrog strategy aimed at supporting, not overthrowing, existing governments. The object was to relieve pressure on the periphery of Soviet continental power by creating a new line of frontier states beyond the American perimeter of containment. The most dramatic bid to exercise this pressure directly on the United States led to the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.⁸⁰ The shift in Soviet policy to outright support of revolutionary movements occurred in the 1970s only after the Soviet Union had achieved *de facto* nuclear parity with the United States.⁸¹

By projecting its ideological frontiers into the third world the Soviet Union created new problems in defining and defending them. It became clear by the late 1960s that the number and variety of national liberation movements required a revision of outworn theoretical conceptions and a more flexible set of policy options. The result was a low-key debate among bureaucratic intelligentsia and different levels of support for the movements by the Soviet leadership that did not quite mesh into a consistent and comprehensive approach.⁸² The specialists had become increasingly sophisticated, the third world had become increasingly complex, and the defense of the land frontiers and those overseas had become increasingly entangled and contradictory. Throughout the Brezhnev years, Soviet foreign policy increased its political and military involvement in the developing countries, providing greater support for anticolonial movements than for separatist movements. In most cases, the Soviet Union engaged in active competition with China for influence over both national liberation movements and foreign communist parties. But Moscow's concerns that local conflicts might antagonize the United States, undermine détente, and possibly escalate into a wider war appeared to exercise a restraining influence on its policy.⁸³ By the mid-1980s it was increasingly clear that the growing Soviet involvement in national liberation movements had imposed a heavy burden on the Soviet economy without having achieved its aim of putting pressure on the United States to reach agreements on other outstanding issues that were more vital to Soviet security, such as arms limitations.

The problems of porous frontiers acquired a wholly new dimension with the development of nuclear weapons, technologies of penetration and surveillance, such as shortwave radios, supersonic aircraft, and satellites. In the postwar

years the traditional means of guarding the frontiers by securing strong points on the periphery or influence beyond it were less effective. U.S. long-range bombers carrying atomic or hydrogen bombs were capable of penetrating Soviet air space and inflicting terrible damage. The development of more powerful bombs and more sophisticated delivery systems operating at even greater range compounded the problem. Soviet foreign policy developed a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand Moscow attempted to overtake the U.S. lead in nuclear weapons and develop delivery systems capable of reaching the United States. On the other hand it sought to negotiate a settlement of all outstanding questions on the basis of military equality. At the same time, the Soviet leadership remained alert to any danger that new technologies could penetrate its frontiers.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Soviet Union reacted violently to repeated penetration of its air space by U.S. aircraft engaged in electronic surveillance. According to semiofficial sources, twenty-five such aircraft were attacked and destroyed during this period. But it was not until 1982 that a comprehensive Law of the USSR State Borders set new restrictions on the violation of Soviet air space that arguably went beyond the commonly accepted practices of international law. Two incidents, the shooting down of the U-2 in 1961 and that of the KAL 007 in 1983, seriously disrupted Soviet-American relations at potentially crucial turning points in the ragged course of détente.⁸⁴

Western shortwave radio broadcasts in Russian from powerful long-range transmitters began first in 1946 with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and the following year with Voice of America (VOA). Radio Free Europe followed in 1950 and Radio Liberation (eventually Radio Liberty) and Deutsche Welle three years later.⁸⁵ As early as 1948 the Soviet Union began to close the other frontier by jamming VOA and then the BBC. It employed this technique more or less consistently with mixed results over the next forty years. In a sign of the seriousness with which the Soviet Union regarded the penetration of its airwaves, the government devoted more resources to jamming than to broadcasting its own domestic and foreign programs. By 1968 there were more than twenty million shortwave receivers in the hands of the Soviet public. The government belatedly sought to forbid the sale of sets that could get the high-frequency bands, but individuals with the know-how were able to adapt their receivers.⁸⁶ In 1988 Gorbachev permanently ended jamming.⁸⁷ His decision may have diminished the image of the Soviet Union as culturally marginal. But the failure to reform the character of Soviet broadcasting left it to Western radio to inform the Soviet public of the dissident national movements, particularly in

the Baltic states. Here the confluence of problems stemming from three persistent factors—porous frontiers, a multinational state, and cultural alienation—contributed to bringing down the entire Soviet structure.⁸⁸

MULTINATIONAL SOCIETY: REVENGE OF THE BORDERLANDS

We were in Georgia. You can get to this land
If Hell is multiplied by paradise.

—Boris Pasternak, 1931

The peculiarities of a multinational society common to the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation posed problems for foreign policy makers that were closely related to porous frontiers. If the outer perimeter of the state was exposed to the penetration of foreign ideas and foreign armies, the inner perimeter remained, as it had been under the empire, the most vulnerable to subversion and invasion. But in the decade between 1914 and 1924 three important changes had taken place between the periphery and the center that affected the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. First, during the civil war and intervention the nationalities had experienced periods of autonomy, independence, or foreign protection. The collective memory of these episodes was never completely repressed. Separatist aspirations rose to the surface in 1941 and again in 1991. Second, the relative weight of the Great Russians in the Soviet population represented only slightly more than half of the total population, although that percentage had increased as a result of the loss of non-Russian territories such as Finland, Poland, and two Armenian provinces.⁸⁹ Third, the Bolsheviks endorsed a three-part nationalities policy that in the long run stimulated national sentiments rather than bringing them under control. They condemned Great Russian chauvinism, recognized the right to national self-determination, and undertook to build a state along federal lines. This signaled a sharp departure from the most recent policies of the tsarist government. That the Communist Party leadership steadily moved over the following decades toward a greater degree of concentration of power at the expense of the nationalities cannot detract from the residual, psychological effect of the original theories and structures. It should not be forgotten that the Soviet nationalities policy, no matter how vacuous or repressive it may have been, delimited the boundaries of the future members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, established cul-

tural institutions such as local branches of the Academy of Sciences, trained cadres of local leaders, and promoted cultural symbols that played a vital role in the formation of nation-states after 1991.

As a man of the borderlands, Stalin forged a nationalities policy linked to his concepts of state building and his conduct of foreign policy. Its contours were shaped by his early life as a Russified Georgian revolutionary in a frontier region and his experience in the civil war as commissar of nationalities and an active participant in the reintegration of Ukraine and Transcaucasia into the new multinational Soviet state. During and after his rise to power he showed tactical flexibility in adjusting his policies to fit his domestic agenda and responding to changes taking place in the international environment.⁹⁰

For Stalin the civil war and intervention threw into bold relief two aspects of security—the constitutional structure of the state and its territorial boundaries. The key to both in Stalin's mind was the geographic location and social composition of the nationalities. Throughout the 1920s he repeatedly warned that the socioeconomic backwardness of the periphery created a "zone of foreign intervention and occupation" where indigenous bourgeois nationalists and foreign capitalist powers had cooperated during the civil war to detach the periphery from the Russian center and stifle the fledgling Soviet republic.⁹¹

Consequently, in the constitutional debates of the early 1920s, Stalin opposed Lenin's "liberalism," as he called it, and won the argument in favor of a more centralized federal system. Stalin's insistence that all the constituent union republics share an international border has generally been interpreted as an empty gesture designed to conform with a spurious right to self-determination. More likely, however, it reminded communists that any sign of excessive nationalism would be treated as a breach of external security, the equivalent of treason, and an offense punishable by death. For this reason, the chief Soviet prosecutor in the show trials of the 1930s, Andrei Vyshinsky, justified the arrest and execution of so-called national communists within the USSR on the basis of their intercourse with foreign powers.⁹² In the 1940s the same accusations were leveled against communists such as Josip Tito, Władysław Gomułka, László Rajk, and Rudolph Slansky for the East European parties.

Stalin's creation and incorporation of four new union republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldavia) in the wake of the Nazi-Soviet partition of Eastern Europe in 1939 all but completed Stalin's state-building project. The criteria for inclusion were in part strategic and in part political. The three Baltic republics would guard the approaches to Leningrad and provide additional naval bases; the acquisition of Moldavia (Bessarabia) would make the Soviet

Union a riparian power on the Danube. In political terms these territories had once been part of the Russian Empire, and, as such, Stalin considered them part of the country's historical patrimony, a point of pride with him. They were also home to many who had been educated in prerevolutionary Russian schools, mirroring his own experience in his native Georgia.⁹³

In the 1930s and 1940s, years of relative military weakness versus the Soviet Union's western neighbors, Stalin dealt with the problem of ambiguous loyalty among the nationalities living in the borderlands by granting them cultural autonomy and establishing local soviets based on the principle of ethnicity. The process became known as "*korenizatsiia*," although Stalin preferred the term "*natsionalizatsiia*."⁹⁴ This administrative innovation may have been inspired by both domestic and foreign concerns. But internal and external security has been closely intertwined throughout Russian history. Stalin's perception of the borderlands as the most vulnerable point of interaction between internal enemies and international capitalism injected new vigor into the idea.

That *korenizatsiia* had a direct relation to Soviet foreign policy emerged most clearly with respect to the so-called Piedmont principle. The concept, mentioned in contemporary Soviet documents, refers to the role played in the nineteenth century by the Kingdom of Piedmont-Savoy as the focus for attracting the loyalty of all patriots living under foreign domination. Throughout most of the 1920s the Soviet government aimed to strengthen the impression among Belarusians and Ukrainians outside the USSR and various national groups in Bessarabia that their co-nationals across the Soviet frontier enjoyed a high degree of political and cultural autonomy. In 1934 the Soviet government launched a campaign to reverse the prerevolutionary image of Galicia as a Piedmont for Ukraine and transform Soviet Ukraine into a Piedmont for Ukrainians living in Poland. In addition, to attract the allegiance of nationalities beyond its frontiers, Stalin ordered the transfer of large territories of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic to enlarge the Belarus republic and to create the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Stalin defended both political and cultural *korenizatsiia* until it became clear that the policy was intensifying, rather than reducing, ethnic conflict within the country.⁹⁵

The breakdown of political *korenizatsiia* coincided with the 1926–1927 war scare with Great Britain, a complex episode when strands of the intraparty struggle became intertwined with Soviet foreign policy. A series of international incidents during these years, including Soviet aid to British workers in the general strike of 1926, British raids on Soviet trade offices leading to a break in diplomatic relations, the collapse of the communist-nationalist united front

in China, and the assassination of the Soviet ambassador in Warsaw, raised fears among the Soviet leadership that war was imminent. It is now clear that these fears not only were groundless but were manipulated by Stalin in his campaign to destroy the Right Opposition.⁹⁶ Stalin was convinced, nonetheless, that frontier people could not be counted on in the event of war with Poland or Romania. At the beginning of the war scare in 1927, OGPU (secret police) reports described the Polish border villages as "defeatist," waiting impatiently for liberation that would achieve "the great power ideas of Poland."⁹⁷ To forestall Polish intervention during agricultural collectivization in the Soviet Union, the Politburo pursued alternate policies; on one hand it ordered repression and deportation of Polish peasants; on the other, it created in 1932 a Polish national region in the Belarus republic to fight Polish "chauvinism." The pendulum swung rapidly back again with the repression of Polish cultural organizations in Ukraine and Belarus and in 1934 with the abolition of the Polish Communist Party.

For the same reasons, a similar uncertainty characterized the policy of the center toward Ukraine. But in this case, the local Ukrainian communists believed it their duty to challenge Polish imperialism, while the center envisaged joint Soviet-Polish repression of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement as the basis for a nonaggression pact.⁹⁸ This well-documented episode is just one illustration of the convoluted and contradictory nature of Soviet policies, as the leadership struggled to overcome economic backwardness through collectivization, secure the loyalties of the nationalities, and defend the state's porous frontiers. At the same time they exploited the nationalities question to penetrate the porous frontiers of neighboring countries.

The multinational character of the Soviet state created fresh problems for the Soviet leaders following Adolf Hitler's rise to power. Stalin was slow to recognize the implications of Nazi racial policies for his nationality policy, but he soon realized that the political aspects of *korenizatsiia* and the doctrine of national self-determination endorsed by the Comintern were vulnerable to Nazi manipulation.⁹⁹ German minorities (Volksdeutsche) throughout Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, were high-profile targets for Nazi propaganda. At home Stalin adjusted his nationality policy to fit the changed international situation by emphasizing the role of the Great Russians in holding together the multinational Soviet state and adopting two guiding "law-governed" principles first articulated by Lenin. Stalin argued that the dialectical process of drawing together (*sblizhitiie*) and fusing (*sliianie*) the nationalities had to be held in creative tension, implicitly to be sure by his own guiding hand. This meant promoting greater

integration and unity of the nationalities, particularly in the face of external threats, without imposing linguistic Russification, which he knew from his own experience in the Caucasus could only drive them apart. Against this backdrop, Stalin introduced the concept of the "great friendship" of nations with Great Russia as big brother.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, he continued to permit the celebration of cultural traditions as long as they did not cross the line into bourgeois nationalism, a line that only he could draw.¹⁰¹

Stalin's policy of cleansing the frontier regions of non-Russian ethnic groups appeared to have a double aim: as a precautionary security measure and as punishment for resistance to collectivization that had been strongest in Ukraine and the North Caucasus. In the first years of collectivization, even before the full implications of the Nazi threat were clear to him, his definition of unreliable elements conflated class and ethnic identities, that is, "kulaks" and "nationalists," as the source of opposition.¹⁰² As a result, the rate of dekulakization was greater among ethnic minorities such as Greeks, Bulgarians, and Germans living in the Black Sea frontier districts.¹⁰³ Once the class danger had receded, on the eve of war, he focused his suspicions exclusively on ethnic groups. The ethnic turn intensified as the perceived threat from Nazi Germany increased and Poland adopted an ambivalent attitude toward its two powerful neighbors. As a consequence of the Sovnarkom decree in April 1936 on the need to "display revolutionary vigilance," fifteen thousand Polish and German households were accused of being politically "unreliable" and uprooted from their homes in the western oblasts of Ukraine. Ethnic Poles were also excluded from living in an eight-hundred-kilometer frontier zone. A year later the government expanded special closed zones to include regions adjacent to Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey. Following a separate order on "resettlement of undesirable elements with the aim of strengthening state frontiers," new frontier districts were created in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Next, it was the Koreans. By the late 1920s eight thousand to ten thousand Koreans a year were migrating across the Soviet frontier with Manchuria. As the international situation in the Far East heated up in the late 1930s, Stalin, viewing the Koreans as potential Japanese agents, ordered the deportation of more than 173,000 from the territory of the Buryat-Mongol Autonomous Republic, Khabarovsk, and the Primorskii krai. At about the same time, the frontier zone of Azerbaijan was cleared of Iranian families.¹⁰⁴

Reproducing patterns established during tsarist times, the expansion and contraction of the Soviet Union's borders led to large-scale forced population movements. The pace of deportations and migration of frontier peoples accel-

erated in 1939–1940 following the Winter War with Finland, and the annexation of west Belarus, west Ukraine, and Bessarabia. After the Finnish defeat, virtually the entire population of the Karelian territory, destined to be annexed by the USSR, about 420,000 people, left for Finland. Roughly two-thirds had returned with the Finnish armies in 1941–1944 and left again following the armistice. In two separate waves, approximately 243,000 Poles were deported from the western regions.¹⁰⁵

Following the outbreak of war with Germany, the tempo of deportations became frenzied in a massive campaign to deport all Germans from European Russia. By the end of 1941 more than 438,000 people from the German Volga Republic were sent east. Even ethnic Germans in the Red Army, numbering over 33,000, were demobilized and reassigned to labor battalions. There was no letup at the end of the war. In 1945, 1946, and 1949 the Ministry of Interior ordered Germans in the frontier regions of the Baltic republics, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova resettled in Siberia.¹⁰⁶

The German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 intensified these practices, having exposed the weakness of Stalin's 1939–1940 policy of annexing territories of the former Russian Empire. Instead of consolidating the frontier along ethnic lines, the annexations introduced a number of Trojan horses into the Soviet citadel and touched off civil wars all along the western periphery in a replay of the civil war and intervention. Stalin responded by launching a massive deportation campaign of non-Russians from the Soviet periphery and by intervening in the domestic politics of East European countries, where civil wars, actual or threatening, greeted the advance of the Soviet army.¹⁰⁷

Stalin, prompted by his chief of secret police, Lavrenti Beria, interpreted any sign of anti-Soviet activity among the nationalities in the face of the German advance as a sign of wholesale defection. Beginning in 1943 the counteroffensive of the Red Army signaled a policy of massive deportation of peoples in the borderlands, including: the Crimean Tatars, Chechen-Ingush, Kalmyks, Balkartsy-Kabardintsy, and many other smaller nationalities.¹⁰⁸ In the orgy of frontier cleansing, merely belonging to a small national minority was grounds for deportation. So, for example, the Greek and Bulgarian populations of the northern shores of the Black Sea and Transcaucasia were deported to Central Asia. Full juridical rehabilitation and permission to return did not occur until forty years later. Gradually the right to return was extended to the Balkartsy-Karachaevtzy, the Kalmyks, and the Chechen-Ingush; in the 1960s and 1970s the right of return was granted to the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks.¹⁰⁹ But the government's attempt to repair damage to the multinational image of the

Soviet Union backfired in the postcommunist period. Rehabilitated and returned to their homeland, the Chechens rose in rebellion, reviving a tradition of resistance to Russian rule that stretches back to the mid-nineteenth century and reopening the persistent problem of the porous Caucasian frontier.

Stalin applied the same punitive policy in the wake of the Red Army's advance into Central Europe. His efforts to redraw the ethnic map of Central and Eastern Europe, aimed at eliminating potential "nests of subversion," initiated the organization of a mass deportation of Volksdeutsch from countries bordering on the Soviet Union—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania. He encouraged the Czech and Yugoslav governments to expel or resettle the Hungarians in Slovakia and the Voevodina. He promoted the resettlement of Poles from their prewar marchlands in the East (*kresy*) to the former German provinces of Pomerania, Silesia, and the southern half of East Prussia.¹¹⁰ The result was the reconfiguration of postwar states in the region along more ethnically homogeneous lines than at any time since the Middle Ages.

The threat of a Trojan horse within the body politic of the multinational Soviet Union was not eliminated by territorial expansion after World War II. On the contrary, the Soviet leaders faced a new situation with the emergence of a politics of internal resistance and ethnic emigration. The existence of Baltic governments in exile, the underground resistance in Lithuania and West Ukraine lasting into the early 1950s, and the enthusiastic reception by Soviet Jews of the first diplomatic representatives of the newly created state of Israel persistently raised the question in the minds of Soviet leaders of dual or divided loyalties among their citizens.

The role of the Jews in Russian foreign policy had a history going back to the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Foreign Minister A. M. Gorchakov attempted to persuade the West European delegates not to extend legal guarantees to the Jews in Serbia or Romania because, like the Jews in Russia, they were different from the Jews in Western Europe and "the equalization of their rights would have harmful consequences for these countries."¹¹¹ The same issue surfaced in the 1950s. When the initial Soviet support for Israel as part of its anti-imperialist strategy shifted to a pro-Arab foreign policy, Soviet Jews with Zionist sympathies, and many without, found themselves consigned to an oppositionist camp. The closer Israel drew to the United States, the more Soviet Jews fell under suspicion as agents of imperialism. When Soviet Jews expressed sympathy with Israel during the Six Weeks War, a new wave of anti-Semitism erupted in the Soviet Union. This led to a sharp increase in Jewish applications to emigrate, which in turn triggered a Soviet reaction.

The Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev was now caught in a bind. To allow Jews to emigrate freely would lead to the loss of a highly educated group in the population, particularly those with advanced degrees in the exact sciences, a brain drain that would seriously affect the Soviet effort to overcome economic backwardness. Emigration to Israel, the preferred goal of the Soviet Jews, would arouse the ire of the Arab states being actively courted by the Soviet Union. But to oppose emigration would antagonize the United States and jeopardize détente, which Brezhnev needed to solve other problems related to the persistent factors: reducing the cost of the arms race, obtaining Western technology necessary to overcome economic backwardness, gaining a free hand to deal with the Chinese threat on his Asian frontier, and securing Western recognition of the frontiers established after World War II.¹¹² The Soviet compromise—to allow Jews to leave but impose an education tax on them—fell short. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Soviet American Trade Treaty of 1973 linked the most favored nation clause to unrestricted Jewish immigration. The Soviet Union denounced the treaty. The amendment complicated Soviet-American relations for decades and has yet to be repealed.¹¹³

In the last years of the Soviet Union the eruption of the multinational question not only took the leadership by surprise but also reopened the question of the government's stability and legitimacy. Despite a flurry of straws in the wind, the Soviet leadership, including Gorbachev, continued to believe they had essentially solved the national question. Repeating Brezhnev's "dialectical" formula on the eve of being blown away by the force he thought benign, Gorbachev stated, "The development of our multinational state is naturally accompanied by a growth in national consciousness. This is a positive phenomenon."¹¹⁴

The nationalist protest movements in the late 1980s would not have acquired the force and momentum they did without the endorsement by the Communist Party's central apparatus of *glasnost* and *zakonnost*, the principles of openness and legality. *Glasnost* and *zakonnost* were attempts "to end the state of stagnation" by freeing the society from the ideological fetters that defined Soviet cultural alienation, and in Gorbachev's words "to remove everything that was holding back development," that is, to overcome economic backwardness.¹¹⁵ Under new conditions of openness, isolated incidents of national protest began to coalesce into "a cycle of mobilization and . . . a tide of nationalism."¹¹⁶ The first autonomous political organizations to emerge in the late 1980s were the popular fronts. Emulating the model of the Baltic peoples, they were emblematic of a multicultural society where the only viable reference group outside the discredited Communist Party was ethnoterritorial.

There was no alternative transnational source of legitimacy and allegiance. The fate of the USSR was sealed.¹¹⁷

CULTURAL ALIENATION

It was a German town that we awoke in
 Endless the long, long roads that stretch behind me
 And only alien cities lie ahead.

—Mikhail Matusovskii, 1945

The initial Bolshevik commitment to spread world revolution opened a cultural distance between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world that waxed and waned but did not disappear until the demise of communism. Afterward a strong residue remained while deeper and older currents rose to the surface. Measuring the cultural alienation of the Soviet Union encounters difficulties of interpretation on three levels: the discourse of international politics, diplomatic practice, and the philosophical underpinnings of science, scholarship, and the fine arts. For example, what was the meaning and relationship between “peaceful coexistence” and the “correlation of forces”? Were changes in Soviet foreign policy tactical or strategic? Were Soviet norms and models for creativity different from those of the international community? These questions became more complex as the interaction developed between the Soviet Union and the international community and as different styles of leadership emerged to cope with new situations.

Confusion and suspicion within the international community over the norms and aims of Soviet foreign policy stemmed from the earliest ideological pronouncements of the leadership and the creation in 1919 of a communist international that quickly showed itself to be an instrument of that policy. The discourse of Soviet foreign policy created the impression that the leadership played by two sets of rules or spoke to two different audiences. The tropes of competition and conflict run through the public statements of communist leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev, as if they were the permanent conditions of international relations. Of the many examples that could be cited, Khrushchev’s famous statement about the demise of capitalism is the most striking. Were his much-quoted words on the demise of capitalism to be translated “We shall bury you”? Or did they mean, “we shall be present at your funeral,” as he subsequently insisted? And what was the real difference between the two ver-

sions?¹¹⁸ The discursive dichotomy in Soviet foreign policy did not cease with the advent of perestroika. As part of his “new political thinking” Gorbachev declared that “alienation is evil.” Yet he insisted that “*perestroika* requires Party leaders who are very close to Lenin’s ideal of a revolutionary Bolshevik.”¹¹⁹ How were Western students of Marxism-Leninism or Gorbachev’s Soviet audience, for that matter, supposed to resolve the contradiction?

The rhetoric of alienation in Soviet foreign policy was institutionalized by the creation in 1919 of the Third International, the Comintern, signaling a radical departure from international norms. The impression that the Soviet Union was an alien actor on the international scene was reinforced when in 1919 the Second Congress set rigid criteria for membership in the form of the twenty-one demands that imposed upon the members an organizational model based on Bolshevik experience. The effect on the external perception of the Soviet role in world politics was twofold. On the one hand it reinforced the impression among European statesmen and diplomats that the Bolshevik dictatorship had passed beyond the limits of civilized nations. On the other hand it permanently split the Left into revolutionary and reformist camps.¹²⁰ These events had a profound influence on most of the major foreign policy issues between the two world wars.

The victorious allies were determined to treat the Bolsheviks as an international pariah. They refused to invite Soviet Russia to participate in the Peace Conference of 1919, the first time that Russia had been excluded from an international congress since the seventeenth century. They imposed a blockade and launched an intervention, however uncoordinated and ineffective, to overthrow the new regime. It took fifteen years for all the major powers to extend diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union, the last being the United States, in 1933. The Soviet Union was admitted to the League of Nations only in 1934 and then for the brief span of six years before it was expelled, the only country to suffer that indignity. The Soviet attack on Finland was the cause, legitimate enough under the Covenant of the League. But the same sanction was not imposed on Japan in 1931 for its occupation of Manchuria or on Italy in 1936 for its attack on Ethiopia. Clearly Soviet policy was being judged on different grounds.

The deep and bitter split between communists and Social Democrats facilitated Hitler’s rise to power and hampered the formation in Europe of a strong popular front to oppose fascism. Suspicions of Soviet motives during the Spanish Civil War helped discourage Britain and France from assisting the republican forces. The same attitudes led to the exclusion of the Soviet Union from

the discussions over the fate of Czechoslovakia leading to the Munich Conference and to the breakdown of talks in Moscow in 1939 between the Anglo-French mission and the Soviet leaders.

In most of these cases external interpretations of Soviet foreign policy collected around two extremes. It was regarded either as purely opportunistic, that is, lacking any principles, or as purely ideological, that is, based solely on principles, although of the wrong kind. The fact that it consistently pursued a goal of revising the Versailles system, which revived old security problems on the western frontier linked to both its multinational society and its porous frontiers, was largely ignored. Yet, it should have been clear from the Soviet inclination to align with the Germans in the 1920s, then the French in the mid-1930s, Germany again in 1939, and *par la force des choses* against Germany after 1941. In all cases the object was to prevent a European "crusade" against communism (a function of cultural alienation) by dividing the capitalists or to restore lost imperial territories and reestablish a more defensible ethnic and strategic frontier. Was this so very different from the policies of the nineteenth century, particularly after the Crimean War?¹²¹

Maxim Litvinov, Soviet foreign commissar from 1929 to 1939, may well have been sincerely committed to a policy of collective security, but his strategic aims were similar, if more subtle, than those of his predecessor, Georgii Chicherin, or his successor, V. M. Molotov, a point not lost on Stalin. Litvinov calculated that if war came, the Soviet Union must have strong allies and the fighting should be done outside Soviet space. Although his policy failed in the end, he had succeeded for a while in narrowing the cultural gap that separated Soviet diplomatic practice from that of the capitalist powers. His long residence in Britain, his English wife, and his cadre of cosmopolitan diplomats all contributed to the reputation he enjoyed at the League of Nations and with foreign diplomats. However, at home his main rivals in the Soviet leadership, Molotov and Andrei Zhdanov, adopted a more isolationist position. Their views on strengthening security by acquiring a territorial buffer to cover the porous frontier to the west carried the day, when the British and French backed away from collective security as defined by Litvinov.

Once the war had broken out, Stalin sought to pursue both collective security and territorial guarantees simultaneously. In talks with Eden and Churchill in 1942 and 1944, at Yalta in 1945, and in the armistice negotiations with Finland and Romania, he proposed only slight revisions in the territorial agreements he had signed with Hitler. He flirted with the idea that he might exploit

a different kind of split in the capitalist world by mediating between the United States and Great Britain. However, he also committed himself to a new international system based on a rough division of the world into spheres of influence and participation in Roosevelt's plan for the United Nations. Stalin's policy may be seen as an attempt to realize his vision of replacing capitalist encirclement with a belt of "friendly countries" and to maintain the wartime alliance with the United States and Great Britain. It was a difficult balancing act, and Stalin lacked Litvinov's subtlety to make it work. Litvinov attributed the breakdown to Stalin's inability to understand the West.¹²²

The replacement of Litvinov by Molotov and later Vyshinsky as foreign minister inaugurated major changes in Soviet diplomatic practice that reinforced Western perceptions of Russia's cultural alienation. The "Litvinovtsy," most of whom were purged in the late 1930s, were professionals—cultivated men and women with a good knowledge of foreign languages and cultures. Their successors displayed none of these characteristics. Molotov later admitted that without experienced diplomats who understood foreign languages, the Soviet leaders feared "being swindled." As a result, he went on, Soviet "diplomacy in the thirties, forties and fifties was highly centralized . . . the ambassadors were only executors of specific orders."¹²³

Nikita Khrushchev's free-wheeling leadership style gave a fillip to well-established Western perceptions of Soviet foreign policy as culturally alien. His bullying of President Kennedy at Vienna, his antics at the UN, and other incidents culminating in the Cuban missile crisis convinced many Western observers and his Soviet associates as well that he was prone to impulsive and at times irrational behavior that had a damaging effect on the Soviet image abroad. It was only after the late 1960s, when Andrei Gromyko and other diplomats who had entered service as novices in the 1940s began to take hold, that foreigners expressed a more balanced appreciation of Soviet diplomatic practice.

Khrushchev's style should not obscure his contributions to a reduction of problems stemming from cultural alienation. His revival of the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, albeit under the threat of a nuclear holocaust, as the basis for negotiations over outstanding problems reduced the unremittingly hostile environment in which diplomats had been forced to operate during Stalin's last years. Similarly, the opening of cultural and scientific exchanges between the Soviet Union and the West and the developing countries contributed to the erosion of cultural marginality. But by this time the belief in incompatible ideological differences had become so deeply rooted in the cultural

life of both the West and the Soviet Union that only a major change such as the crisis that inspired Gorbachev's "new thinking" could shake the established stereotype of Soviet cultural alienation.¹²⁴

As the cultural distance between the liberal, capitalist West and the USSR diminished, it increased within the international communist movement. Lenin's definition of Russia as "the weakest link in the imperialist chain" recognized its intermediate position between the industrial West and the colonial East. The success of its revolution enabled its leaders to claim special knowledge in promoting revolution in societies that were in socioeconomic terms the most advanced and the most backward. As the home of the first successful socialist revolution, the Soviet Union exercised throughout most of its history a powerful attraction for many throughout the world who were disillusioned with capitalism, fearful of the rise of fascism, and hostile to colonial rule; it served as an inspiration, a model for development, a military power, and a source of material support for a wide spectrum of the Left. A broad spectrum of sympathizers identified with Soviet policies that promoted socially progressive causes, fought the good fight in Spain, liberated Eastern Europe from Hitler, and supported anticolonial revolutionary movements. In their eyes the Soviet Union had moved from the cultural margins of the dominant international power structure to an imaginary center of a new world civilization.

In the long run, however, Soviet determination to maintain its centrality within the communist movement had the unintended and paradoxical consequence of spreading disunity.¹²⁵ Four major components tipped the balance toward the alienation of the Soviet Union within the international communist movement. The first was the insistence of Soviet leaders on the primacy of Soviet interests in their strategy of world revolution. This was implicit in the twenty-one demands of the Second Comintern Congress in 1920 and made explicit in Stalin's doctrine of socialism in one country. The Soviet-first view survived throughout the existence of that organization and its truncated successor (the Cominform) and withstood abortive attempts by, for example, the Conference of Sixty-One Communist Parties to establish a communist commonwealth, socialist interstate agreements such as the Warsaw Pact, and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).

The second component was the unique character of the Russian Revolution. Soviet leaders and political analysts made it clear to other communist, anticolonial, and social revolutionary movements that only the Soviet Union, because of its revolutionary experience, was capable of making the direct leap

from a capitalist to a socialist society. Lenin had suggested the possibility of a transitional democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry as early as 1905 but then abandoned the idea. Stalin and his successors revived, revised, and applied the concept of a transitional stage to socialism first to Spain during the civil war and then after World War II to Eastern Europe, and finally in the 1960s as "revolutionary democracies" in the third world.¹²⁶ When the Communist Party (CPSU) was building socialism in the Soviet Union, other parties were struggling to launch a revolution; when the CPSU was building communism in the Soviet Union, other parties were building socialism, always one step behind and lacking the leading role of the most advanced state within the movement.

A third component was the purges of foreign communist parties at the instigation of the Soviet Union. The most serious so-called blood purges took place under Stalin in the late 1930s and late 1940s. In the first instance, whole parties were either wiped out (e.g., the Polish Communist Party) or virtually crippled by the arrests and executions (e.g., the German and Yugoslav parties) and had to be rebuilt from the bottom up. In the late 1940s, the emphasis shifted toward show trials of leading communists in the people's democracies of Eastern Europe, many of whom were later executed. Although the executions ceased with Stalin's death, expulsions from foreign parties did not. They remained part of the Soviet interventionist arsenal.

The fourth component was direct intervention by Soviet armed forces in states either under the control of a communist party or, as in the case of Afghanistan, a revolutionary regime. These interventions were in a way an extension in the post-Stalinist period of the purges in that they aimed to remove from power communists or social revolutionaries who were regarded as dissident or, in Soviet parlance, "counterrevolutionaries" (i.e., anti-Soviet). The list is well known: East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan in 1979, and Poland in 1980.¹²⁷ A declaration spelling out the right to intervene to maintain a socialist state was articulated only under Brezhnev, but it had existed implicitly since the creation of the first non-Russian socialist state. In fact, the precedents were set in the post-1917 civil war when the Red Army overthrew socialist governments in Ukraine and Transcaucasia.

An inherent tension existed in the Soviet cultural monopoly of revolution. On the one hand, Soviet leaders emphasized the unique (and superior) character of their state's revolutionary tradition, implying that other socialist revolutions could not duplicate it. On the other hand, they disputed or rejected

efforts by other revolutionary movements to define their own ideological course. Following Stalin, Soviet leaders (including Gorbachev) reserved the right to revise Marxism-Leninism within the Soviet context, as they assumed that the Soviet Union had the right to define it in the international movement. But communists in other countries expressing different cultural traditions took issue with this view. Philosophical revisionism within the bloc began within the communist parties themselves.¹²⁸ Popular disturbances in East Germany in 1953, Hungary and Poland in 1956, and Poland in 1980 were initiated by workers. Soviet intervention or threats of intervention revealed the fears among the leadership that reopening "separate roads to socialism," closed since 1948, might spill over into the non-Russian borderlands that could also claim cultural distinctiveness.¹²⁹

The last Soviet attempt to create a communist commonwealth, which occurred during a meeting of the eighty-one communist parties in Moscow in 1960, produced more than an open Sino-Soviet split. What emerged was a wide range of political attitudes.¹³⁰ The most revisionist of these crystallized in the late 1970s when the Spanish and Italian parties launched what the Spanish communist leader Santiago Carillo first called "Euro-communism." Under that rubric, they rejected several of the fundamental tenets of Marxism-Leninism such as the one-party system and the centrally planned economy. Although the Soviet leaders found such actions distressing, they lacked the will and authority to extirpate the heresy, adopting what Robert Legvold called an "agnostic" position, critical but not inquisitorial.¹³¹

Some similarities but also important differences characterized relations with Chinese and other Asian communist parties, reflecting another dimension of the Soviet Union's cultural alienation. Recognizing the vast cultural differences that separated China, Europe, and Russia, Mao Zedong and Ho Chi Minh staked out their own revolutionary positions. By the mid-1930s Mao had already laid claim to a place in the communist pantheon of original thinkers by stressing China's "unique and original development in the course of human history."¹³² The Soviet Union (and the Comintern) did not challenge Mao openly, but they did attempt to moderate his revolutionary activity to accommodate the changing international situation beginning in 1934 and continuing to 1949, first by adhering to unity of action with the Kuomintang against Japan; then by avoiding a direct clash with the United States; and finally by bringing China's northern borderlands (Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Xinjiang) into the Soviet sphere of influence. The communists' victory in China's civil war in 1949 reinforced Mao's belief in the correctness of his course. Although

he was willing to defer to Stalin even on matters that ran against China's interests, he was not so accommodating with the old dictator's successors. Changes in leadership and the pressure within the international system weakened the centripetal forces and accelerated the centrifugal forces that characterized the cultural alienation of Soviet foreign policy.

Paradoxically, the cultural distance between the Communist Party in the Soviet Union and those in Asia widened at a time when their interests appeared to draw them closer. No doubt this explains why most Western specialists initially doubted the seriousness of the Sino-Soviet split. Even now, when archival materials reveal the fierce debates between representatives of the Chinese and Soviet communist parties from 1957 to 1963, their disputes about real policy issues, such as the possibility of surviving a nuclear war or the need for détente with the United States, do not appear to provide sufficient reasons for the depth of the conflict. Or to put it another way, the cultural dimensions of the conflict, rooted in differences over conflicting claims of equality and supremacy within the communist movement, help to explain why specific issues were so difficult to resolve.

A long-standing cultural bias existed among Soviet leaders going back to Lenin, who adopted it from Marx's theory of the Asiatic mode of production. Stalin for one had always perceived Asia through a different lens. When the Chinese Communists approached him about joining the Cominform, he replied that the fundamental differences between Europe and Asia made it infeasible. He emphasized that the popular democracies of Eastern Europe and the "democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants in China" were separated by "not so small differences" from one another and implicitly from the Soviet Union.¹³³

Despite efforts to consolidate the partnership with China, Stalin's successors were continually confronted with Beijing's demand for equality within the Sino-Soviet relationship. This showed up most clearly in the long, acerbic discussions in the late 1950s and early 1960s between representatives of the Soviet and Chinese communist parties. There were real policy differences over détente, nuclear disarmament, disputed borders, and migration. But standing in the shadows of all these differences were the fundamental issues of equality and the meaning of history. Mao made this unmistakably clear in his 1957 speech to the Chinese Communist Party Politburo when he stated that Soviet "ways of thinking, behavior and historical traditions differ from ours."¹³⁴ As Chen Jian has pointed out, Khrushchev and Mao talked about equality on the assumption that each occupied the position of cultural superiority. The failure

of a discussion led by Mikhail Suslov and Deng Xiaoping over specific issues resulted in mutual denunciations of a principled kind and dealt a mortal blow to the international communist movement.¹³⁵ Unable to convert détente into a "steady state" or to consolidate the international communist movement, the Soviet Union, like its tsarist predecessor, remained suspended between several cultural worlds and at home in none of them.

Another aspect of Soviet cultural alienation emerged most clearly during an intense debate from 1958 to 1964 over cultural contacts with the outside world as part of a general discussion on the relationship between the party and the creative intelligentsia. Two Ideological Commissions of the Central Committee invited representatives of the intelligentsia to present their views at closed meetings and, from them, produced a series of instructions to the party apparatus. One of the goals of the commissions was to issue detailed instructions on limiting foreign cultural contacts as part of the party's general mission to reassert control over the arts.¹³⁶ What was unusual about the discussions was the employment by each side—the creative intelligentsia and the party's ideological watchdogs—of a distinctive discourse replete with contrasting tropes. A semiotic analysis of the exchange reveals the extent to which both sides occupied a culturally alien position *vis-à-vis* Western norms.¹³⁷ Although the representatives of the intelligentsia argued for the right to express themselves freely, to be sure without using such explicit language, they were often sharply critical of Western "abuse" of that same freedom.¹³⁸

The discussions and resolutions of the Central Committee split Russian political culture into three unequal parts: the official, the dissenters, and the dissidents.¹³⁹ The latter group refused to abide by the tacit agreement following the debates of 1963–1964, namely, no persecution if no open confrontation. The trials, imprisonment, or expulsion of Josif Brodsky, Andrei Siniavsky, and Yury Daniel were followed in the 1970s by the departure of other major cultural figures who refused to accept the tacit agreement. The arrival of each celebrated émigré in the West strengthened the external perception that an unbridgeable gap separated Soviet culture from that of "the civilized world." By failing to enlist the intelligentsia as a partner in reform, the Communist Party drove many dissenters into open dissidence. In the case of Solzhenitsyn, the publication of *Gulag Archipelago* devastated the Soviet Union's image abroad, particularly among French intellectuals on the Left, who concluded that the Soviet system was rotten to the core.¹⁴⁰

That the Soviet leaders never fully appreciated the damage inflicted by their cultural policies on the prestige and perception of their country abroad emerges

clearly from their willingness to sign the Helsinki Agreements in 1975. The Soviet decision was intended to deal with one aspect of the permeable frontiers by obtaining *de facto* recognition of the postwar borders of Europe. In exchange, the Soviet Union agreed to observe a series of human rights provisions, which, in light of its repressive cultural policies, was tantamount to opening itself to foreign intervention in its domestic affairs.

PERSISTENT FACTORS AND CONTEMPORARY VARIATIONS IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA

The realignment of global power relationships and the transformation of the Russian state and society after 1991 raise questions about the extent to which the persistent factors continue to influence the formation of Russian foreign policy. The main problem is to identify which elements of continuity survived the radical transformation of Russia's institutional and social structures as well as changes in the leadership and the international environment since the collapse of the Soviet Union. With Russians now comprising 90 percent of the population of the Russian Federation, what remains of the former Soviet Union's multinational society? With Great Russia having adopted a free market economy and abandoned notions of autarchy, is not economic backwardness a thing of the past? With the end of the one-party system and reigning Marxist-Leninist ideology, as well as the introduction of elections and open access to world communications, have not the problems of cultural alienation and porous frontiers substantially diminished in their impact on the conduct of foreign policy?

The four persistent factors have left their mark on Russia's foreign relations as legacies of empire not only in specific cases but also in their interaction, which if anything has become more focused. The loss of the non-Russian periphery with the collapse of the Soviet Union created one new problem and revived another related to both the tsarist and Soviet constructions of a multinational state with porous frontiers. For the first time in modern history, a large Russian population lives across the frontiers in neighboring countries. Although often referred to as the "Russian diaspora," the term is somewhat misleading. Its members were caught up in a process of internal resettlement that was sometimes voluntary but at other times forced—a phenomenon that extended back to the early years of the Muscovite state in the sixteenth century. They did not emigrate and were cut off from their homeland when the

Soviet Union fell apart. But the new Russian Federation did not abandon them, and therein lay the problem. The Russian government has lobbied hard to obtain special status for ethnic Russians living in the successor states even to the point of granting them dual citizenship. Moscow has used the presence of substantial Russian populations in Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Ukraine to press for closer integration of the CIS.

By far the most serious legacy of the multinational state has been the rebellion in Chechnya and its connection to Islamic fundamentalism, especially in the six Muslim successor states of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The Chechens were conquered by Russian forces in the mid-nineteenth century, but only after a long and bloody war. They were never assimilated into the tsarist or Soviet state. They fiercely resisted collectivization until the eve of World War II. Armed bands reappeared during the German invasion. The Soviet government deported the entire population in January and February 1944. Rehabilitated by Khrushchev, the Chechens gradually returned to their homeland embittered and impoverished. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union they declared their independence, which Moscow refused to recognize. Since 1992 the post-Soviet governments have been unable to repress the rebellion or satisfy Chechen demands.

The wider significance of the Chechen War for Russian foreign policy is related to Moscow's efforts to stabilize the weak, post-Soviet Muslim states and to find a *modus vivendi* with Muslims outside former Soviet territory.¹⁴¹ Over the last three decades, Soviet and Russian troops have fought Islamic forces in Afghanistan (1979–1989), Tajikistan (1992–1993), Chechnya (1994–1996 and again since 1999), and Dagestan (1999). When the Chechens invaded the Russian republic of Dagestan in 1999, the Taliban in Afghanistan raided Tajikistan. Russian efforts to mediate in conflicts involving Muslims both inside and outside the CIS include the resolution of the civil war in Tajikistan in 1997 with the good offices of Moscow and Tehran. At the time, Russia's ambassador in Tajikistan warned, "If religious radicals strengthen their positions in Central Asia, a 'holy war' might create a Muslim state on the Russian territory as well."¹⁴² Russia's relations with Iran and Arab states in the Near East are conditioned in part by its vulnerability on the Chechnya conflict. Russian policy toward the entire Muslim world must be carefully calibrated to oppose Islamic extremism both within and across Russia's frontiers and, at the same time, to cultivate good relations with stable governments of large Muslim populations such as Iran. Superficially, it would appear that this balancing act would bring Russia in line with U.S. policy. But the differences in perception and interests over the

key issue of who within the region constitutes the greater danger and how it should be managed have divided Russia and the United States as much as they have united them.

The breakup of the Soviet Union has made it more difficult for Russia to police its frontiers than at any other time since the eighteenth century. One reason is that the new external boundaries were not originally designed to be international. They were drawn in the 1920s or, in many cases, even earlier under tsarist rule to serve internal administrative functions. Another reason is that the decline of central authority in the 1990s allowed the growth of regional identities, particularly on the periphery. Certain border regions have shown signs of exploiting their geographically marginal position and reinventing their historical identity to gain an advantage in bargaining with the center.¹⁴³ As a result, Russia's frontiers have become once again ill defined and contested. They have become the sites of massive, illegal border crossings of people, drugs, arms, and terrorists—a situation that has prompted Russia to reach reciprocal arrangements with its neighbors over frontier security. It is no wonder that President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated, first in 2001 and again in September 2004, that Russia's relations with the countries of the CIS are the highest priority.¹⁴⁴ Nor is it surprising that he is determined to reduce regional autonomy and reimpose centralized authority.

A third reason closely related to the other two is the emergence of a new constellation of powers on the Russian periphery composed of the European Union, China, and the United States, each of which constitutes both a potential challenge to Russian security and an opportunity for "partnership." The enlargement of the European Union to include Ukraine, the military and economic presence of the United States in the Middle East and Central Asia, and the population pressure on Siberia from China's northern provinces have been cause for concern in Moscow. The Russian response has been pragmatic but not without problems. As in the past, the defense of Russia's frontiers forces its interaction with three different cultural and political systems—the European, Middle Eastern, and East Asian. In addition there is the need to deal with the United States, which, for different reasons, is also involved in all three areas. Difficulties arise for Moscow in seeking to maintain equilibrium among the competing demands of this complex international environment. Reactions abroad, particularly in the West, to tactical shifts in Russian foreign policy are often expressed in terms of cultural alienation. Even the most optimistic Russian observers have concluded that "in the foreseeable future Russia may be with the West but not of it."¹⁴⁵

Interpretations differ over the motivation for Putin's policies in dealing with the western borderlands. What cannot be denied is how closely they resemble historical Russian responses to frontier problems in the region. Putin has supported a pro-Russian regime in Belarus that is odious to the West but in Russian eyes may be preferable to a liberal government that leans the other way, in the direction of Poland and NATO. His policy toward Ukraine appears to be similarly motivated by concerns over external penetration. For example, Moscow denounced foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for having supported the Orange Revolution and criticized representatives of Poland and Lithuania for playing a mediating role in the Ukrainian political crisis. The renewed interest of Poland in Belarus and Ukraine can only remind the Russians of their long competition with the Poles over influence in the borderlands, assumed to have ended in 1945. Similar problems have complicated relations with Estonia and Latvia, countries with large Russian populations. Russia long refused to negotiate a final boundary with them in a vain attempt to prevent or slow their joining NATO and the European Union.

The U.S. penetration of Russia's strategic space along its southern flank has opened a new, potentially vulnerable frontier with territories that were once Soviet republics or clients. U.S.-Russian rivalry in the region has both military and economic ramifications. The armed interventions of the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, the establishment of U.S. bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and the introduction of training groups in Georgia have gone far beyond any challenge to Russian interests in the region mounted by Great Britain during the Great Game. Throughout the 1990s Russian and U.S. companies engaged in fierce bidding for contracts to build oil pipelines from Central Asia and Caucasian fields to the West. Although the battle of the pipelines has ended, the competition for oil resources continues. The Soviet response has been to form with China and the four Central Asian states the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It has maintained a low profile and its representatives deny they have any ambitions to emulate NATO. They have stated clearly that the organization is opposed to the U.S. policy of creating a military corridor around Russia and China and in 2005 called for a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. bases from Central Asia. But there are rifts in the group. The ongoing struggle for spheres of influence between Russia and the United States changes the political alignment of the Central Asia states from one year to the next. In 2004 one analysis showed Russia predominant in Armenia, Kazakhstan,

and Tajikistan, and the United States in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, with Georgia and Kyrgyzstan open to influence from both.¹⁴⁶ Two years later the configuration held true in scarcely any of its parts.

The growth of the power of the state in regulating domestic and foreign economic relations has given rise to perceptions that Russia is once again displaying the features of a culturally alien society. In the immediate post-Soviet period, the country's leaders eagerly claimed that they had accepted a new system of values based on individual liberties and the free market. In a whirlwind propaganda campaign, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev explicitly linked his pleas for Russia's new cultural centrality and specific foreign policy aims. He argued that a new Marshall Plan for Russia would facilitate its entry into "the family of civilized states." It would further clear the way for the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (later the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE), with Russian participation, to address the security problems produced by border conflicts around the new state. At the same time, he maintained that Russia ought to be recognized as a great power and an equal partner with the West on the basis of its human and intellectual resources, vast natural resources, and geographical location and size. The goal of nuclear disarmament meant the establishment of a "special kind of relationship" with the United States.¹⁴⁷ By the mid-1990s, however, a reaction had set in, partly in response to the disillusionment over the lack of substantial Western economic aid and partly because of the deteriorating conditions of the Russian economy during the process of privatization, a process it appeared to many in Russia that had been engineered and mismanaged by Western economists. The reaction was associated with an ideological shift dubbed the "new Eurasianism."

New Eurasianism simply meant avoidance of excessive dependence on the West and a retreat from an untrammelled free market at home and abroad. It appeared that the Russian economy was moving toward an intermediate position between Western and Asian models of economic development: on the one hand, an emphasis on the role of the free market, mass consumption, and state social services; on the other, a focus on rates of growth, government support and protection of enterprises, and encouragement of accumulation. In the mid-1990s the terms "individualist values" versus "collectivist values" were widely invoked in the Russian media. In foreign economic policy, the new Eurasianism took the form of substituting energy for declining military power as a means of reasserting Russia's traditional influence over the successor states of

the CIS.¹⁴⁸ Since 2003 Putin's attack on the wealth and influence of the oligarchs, like his attempts to reduce the authority of the regional barons and to control the media, has been part of a campaign to enhance the power of the state and to control and manage the economy.

Putin's actions have often been interpreted in the West as a retreat from democratic practices and respect for human rights. Russia's attempts to intervene diplomatically, economically, and, on occasion, militarily in the "near abroad," a term employed by the Russian leadership to define the territory of the former Soviet Union but rejected by those to whom it is applied, have complicated relations with the European Union, which perceives such activities as lacking in sophistication and not being "civilized."¹⁴⁹ For the first time since the fall of communism, Russia has slipped into the category of "not free" in the international rankings established by Freedom House.¹⁵⁰ But overall, the consensus has been that in all areas of foreign policy a new pragmatism prevails and that "Eurasianism is over."¹⁵¹ Although this may be true at the highest levels of policy making, it is not easy to alter cultural perceptions that have become embedded in educational institutions and the popular mentality.¹⁵² There is ample evidence in the Russian media and on the floor of the State Duma that Eurasianist, as much as Western, sympathies continue to attract vocal advocates as well as others who, for pragmatic reasons, champion both.

The major foreign policy problems facing the Russian leadership in the post-Soviet period continue to arise from the four persistent factors analyzed in this chapter, although their specific features and patterns of interaction have undergone changes. The loss of the majority of the federation's non-Russian population has not ended the security problems of a multinational society with porous frontiers, but instead has merely transposed them. The Islamic factor and the so-called diaspora, both legacies of empire, have created threats to Russia's security along its southern frontier as well as opportunities to intervene in the affairs of its immediate neighbors. Efforts to repress the Chechen revolt and strengthen ties with the CIS invariably raise the specter of Russian imperialism in the international community, mainly in the United States and Europe, and jeopardize Russia's efforts to be accepted as a normal, "civilized" member of that community. Similarly, attempts to overcome Russia's relative economic backwardness, exacerbated by a crash program of "Westernization" in the early 1990s, have led to a greater concentration of power in the hands of the president and predictable criticism from abroad. If post-Soviet Russia fails to meet its international obligations under the terms of membership in the OSCE and the Council of Europe, then what differentiates its behavior from

past actions such as Soviet violations of the Helsinki Agreements or the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Territories? Or so the question may be posed. Thus, Russia's endeavors to solve problems arising from one of the persistent factors have created or intensified problems related to one or several of the others. Can the present leadership break the cycle?

Following in the footsteps to Gorbachev and Yeltsin, President Putin has launched a series of initiatives aimed at resolving the conundrum. But changing circumstances in the international system and in the nature of leadership itself further complicate his problems. First, the United States has taken advantage of its new position as the sole superpower to press vigorously for a global transformation of political systems in its own image. It has also taken a lead in defining the rules of the war against terrorism. Through international agencies such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as well as its own powerful export instruments, the United States is having an unprecedented impact on the global economic environment in which Russians must operate. Its cultural exports, particularly in the field of pop culture, now flow unimpeded into Russian space. This new form of "capitalist encirclement," whether perceived by Russians as benign or aggressive, exercises a powerful influence on Russian policy makers and the public.

Second, Russia must deal with the growing power of China and its renewed interest in Central Asia as an energy source, a trading partner, and a potentially dangerous locus of support for Muslim separatism in Xinjiang Province. As the Russian population of eastern Siberia declines and the Russian diaspora shrinks in Central Asia, Chinese migration into the border provinces increases. As yet, there are no signs that China intends to expand territorially. But to replace Russian influence in Central Asia or Siberia, that may not be necessary.

The third major factor of change in the complex equation of Russian foreign policy is domestic and structural. Since the fall of communism, the leadership has had to operate in a public sphere that, in the West, may appear to be cramped or even shrinking. But interest groups and political parties still contend with one another as policy shifts and ministerial appointments continue to demonstrate. Current evaluations in the West of President Putin's policies range from pragmatic (positive) to chaotic (negative). These policies might better be perceived as attempts by a new kind of leadership to devise solutions within a changing international environment to problems arising from the interaction of persistent factors that have restrained and shaped Russian foreign policy for centuries.

NOTES

1. George Kennan restated this truism in his testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *New York Times*, April 5, 1989. "Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chaired by Senator Claiborne Pell (D-R1): Testimony of Professor George Kennan," *New York Times*, April 4, 1989.
2. Lucien Febvre with the assistance of Lionel Bataillon, *La terre et l'évolution humaine* (Paris: Michel, 1970), chap. 1; Andre-Louis Sanguin, *Vidal de la Blache, 1845–1918: Une génie de la géographie* (Paris: Belin, 1993), p. 127; Paul Vidal de la Blache, *Tableau de la géographie de la France* (Paris: Tallandier, 1979), pp. 1–7.
3. Denys Hay, *Europe: The Emergence of an Idea*, 2d ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), pp. 57–60. See also Geoffrey Barraclough, *The Medieval Empire: Idea and Reality* (London: Historical Association, 1950); and Denis de Rougemont, *The Idea of Europe* (New York: Macmillan, 1966); Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, "The Emergence of Eurasianism," *California Slavic Studies*, no. 4 (1967); Ilya Vinokovetsky, "Classical Eurasianism and Its Legacy," *Canadian American Studies* 34, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 25–140.
4. The following is based on Alfred J. Rieber, "Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay," in *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Hugh Ragsdale (Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center and Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 315–359. I have slightly altered some of the terminology. "Multicultural" has given way to "multinational" in order to reflect the evolution of ethnic into national identities in the twentieth century, and "cultural alienation" replaces "cultural marginality," which was criticized for implying inferiority; this had not been my intention.
5. For a devastating critique of the failure of American academic and government officials to uncover the massive distortions of Soviet statistics, see John Howard Wilhelm, "The Failure of the American Sociological Economics Profession," *Europe-Asia Studies* 55, no. 1 (2003): 59–74.
6. Marshall D. Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963) is a good case study of how these changes had already influenced Stalin's latter-day policies.
7. Soldiers' soviets were briefly established in a few cities in Germany, the crumbling Habsburg monarchy, and even Bulgaria, but aside from the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, these were ephemeral events, although they sparked considerable enthusiasm among the Bolsheviks at the time.
8. Peter Gatrell, "The First World War and War Communism, 1914–1920," in *The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913–1945*, ed. R. W. Davies, Mark Harrison, and S. G. Wheatcroft (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), especially pp. 220, 222, 224, 228–229. The amount of railroad track laid down from 1914 to early 1917 (eleven thousand kilometers) actually exceeded the Soviet performance during the Second World War (nine thousand kilometers). During both world wars,

- rising productivity in defense industries and transportation was accompanied by a sharp decline in civilian industrial production.
9. Moshe Lewin, *Russia/USSR/Russia: The Drive and Drift of a Super State* (New York: New Press, 1995), pp. 48–50, summarizes the Soviet literature demonstrating that key sectors of industrial production fell to pre-1861 levels.
 10. Peter Holquist, *Making War: Forging Revolution in Russia's Continuum of Crisis, 1914–1921* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).
 11. Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), chap. 6. Later Gerschenkron characterized the Soviet economy as a throwback to the mercantilist state of Peter the Great with its subjugation of the peasantry and "self-perpetuating force of an inherently unstable dictatorship." Alexander Gerschenkron, *Europe in the Russian Mirror: Four Lectures in Economic History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 121. In like spirit Moshe Lewin used the term "superstructure suspended in air." Moshe Lewin, *The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia* (New York: Pantheon, 1985), pp. 260–261.
 12. There were actually two treaties signed at Brest; the first recognized a breakaway, anti-Bolshevik Ukrainian government.
 13. V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, 2d ed., 35 vols. (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1930–1935), vol. 25, pp. 498, 501; vol. 26, pp. 14, 15; vol. 30, p. 384; E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923*, vol. 3 (New York: Macmillan, 1953), chap. 25, "Revolution over Europe."
 14. The foreign policy volumes of E. H. Carr, *A History of Soviet Russia*, remain indispensable for the early years. See *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923*, vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1950), part 3; vol. 3, *The Interregnum 1923–24* (London: Macmillan, 1953), part 2; *Socialism in One Country, 1924–1926*, vol. 3 (London: Macmillan, 1964), parts 1 and 2; *Foundations of a Planned Economy, 1926–1929*, vol. 3 (London: Macmillan, 1971), part 3. For more recent interpretations, see Teddy Uldricks, *Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations, 1917–1930* (London: Sage, 1979); Branko Lazitch and M. Draskovitch, *Lenin and the Comintern*, 2 vols. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972); Richard Debo, *Revolution and Survival: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1917–1918* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979); Richard Debo, *Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918–1921* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992).
 15. Louis Fischer, *The Soviets in World Affairs: A History of the Relations Between the Soviet Union and the Rest of the World, 1917–1929* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), vol. 1, p. 463.
 16. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, vol. 3, p. 283; E. H. Carr, *Socialism in One Country* (New York: Macmillan, 1958), vol. 1, pp. 454–455.
 17. Carr, *Socialism in One Country*, vol. 1, pp. 273–279, 293–297, 443–445.
 18. Robert Lewis, "Foreign Economic Relations," in *The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union, 1913–1945*, ed. R. W. Davies, Mark Harrison, and S. G. Wheatcroft (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 198–215. In staging trials of

bourgeois specialists, Stalin sought to link their alleged sabotage to foreign engineers and the threat of foreign intervention. Kendall E. Bailes, *Technology and Society Under Lenin and Stalin: Origins of the Soviet Scientific Intelligentsia, 1917–1941* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

19. The key instrument for obtaining foreign technology was the state monopoly on foreign trade. As L. B. Krastin repeatedly stated, its object was not “narrowly commercial” but “productive-economic.” V. A. Shishkin, *Polosa priznanii i vneshe-ekonomicheskaya politika SSSR (1924–1928 gg.)* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1983), pp. 81, 94.

20. It turned out that the war scare was manipulated by Stalin to discredit the Right Opposition, another instance of blurring the differences between domestic and foreign policy.

21. R. W. Davies, *The Soviet Economy in Turmoil, 1929–1930* (London: Macmillan, 1989), pp. xiv–xviii, 34–35, quotation at p. xiv.

22. The share of defense in the total budget expenditure rose in the following pattern: 1933: 3.4%; 1934: 9.1%; 1935: 11.1%; 1936: 16.1%; 1937: 16.5%; 1938: 18.7%; 1939: 25.6%; 1940: 32.6%. Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR, 1917–1991* (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 230. After a postwar decline, the defense share began to creep back up from 18.7% in 1950 to 21.2% in 1952 and 23.9% in 1953. *Ibid.*, p. 328. From 1950 to 1955 the Soviet Union devoted a higher percentage of its GNP to defense than the United States did. R. W. Davies, *Soviet Economic Development from Lenin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 71.

23. James Barber and Mark Harrison, *The Soviet Home Front, 1941–1945: A Social and Economic History of the USSR in the Second World War* (London: Longman, 1991), pp. 189–190.

24. As late as September 1945 Stalin frankly outlined Soviet economic needs to a visiting group of American senators. He dismissed his earlier views on self-sufficiency and stated that “the greater the economic development of a country, the greater its foreign trade potential.” He estimated a need for six billion dollars to pay for five million tons of rail, 10,000 locomotives, 150,000 railroad cars and 40,000–50,000 machine tools. U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the U.S.: The Soviet Union, 1945*, vol. 5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 882–883. For different interpretations of American motives, see John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 178–182, 194–197, 215–220; and Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1945* (New York: Random House, 1968), pp. 335–338.

25. George W. Breslauer has characterized the three ruling strategies of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev as “reforming,” “adapting,” and “transforming.” Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982); and Breslauer, *Gorbachev and Yeltsin as Leaders* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). For the application of Khrushchev’s and Brezhnev’s approach to foreign policy, see James Richter, *Khrushchev’s Double*

Bind (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); and Richard D. Anderson, *Public Politics in an Authoritarian State: Making Foreign Policy During the Brezhnev Era* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). With their combined emphasis on personal styles of leadership and the Soviet political system, these are good examples of injecting social science methods into the historical school of great men. Although Richter asserts that both Khrushchev and Brezhnev endorsed a similar policy of “offensive détente,” he does not show how persistent factors might have helped shape those choices. Richter, *Khrushchev’s Double Bind*, chaps. 7, 8.

26. Mark Harrison, “Economic Growth and Slowdown,” in *Brezhnev Reconsidered*, ed. Edwin Bacon and Mark Sandle (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2002), p. 45.

27. Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

28. R. Craig Nation and Mark V. Kauppi, eds., *The Soviet Impact on Africa* (Lexington, MA: Heath, 1984), especially pp. 233–235.

29. Rajan Menon, *Soviet Power and the Third World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).

30. Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), pp. 141, 146.

31. Alec Nove, *An Economic History of the USSR, 1917–1991* (London: Penguin Books, 1992), pp. 378–379.

32. Bruce Parrott, ed., *Trade, Technology and Soviet-American Relations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985).

33. Bruce Parrott, “Soviet Foreign Policy, Internal Politics, and Trade with the West,” in Parrott, *Trade, Technology, and Soviet-American Relations*, pp. 41–57.

34. For a selection of excerpts by Soviet critics, see Alec Nove, *Glasnost in Action: Cultural Renaissance in Russia* (Boston: Unwin, Hyman, 1989), chap. 8. Significantly, Nove identifies the reformers with a “cultural revolution,” thus linking attempts to overcome economic backwardness with the elimination of the mental gap that lay at the heart of cultural alienation.

35. He further recognized that this reform would entail other deep changes in the bureaucratic structure and social conventions. Mikhail Gorbachev, *Zhizn i reformy*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Novosti, 1995), pp. 280–281. Acknowledgment of economic backwardness was widespread among his close advisers. See, for example, Anatoly S. Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, trans. Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p. 24. Chernyaev writes, “Science and technology are reaching new frontiers worldwide while we lag ten to thirty years behind.” *Ibid.*

36. Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, pp. 192–201, quotation at pp. 200–201. For an analysis of the “intractable military-industrial sector,” see William E. Odorn, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), chap. 11.

37. Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), chap. 5.

38. There is wide disagreement among scholars over the seriousness of the problems facing the late Soviet and early post-Soviet economy as well as the reasons for the collapse of the command economy. For recent revised views on both topics see Andrei Shleifer and Daniel Treisman, "A Normal Country," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 2 (March–April, 2004): 20–38; Gerard Roland, "The Russian Economy in 2005," <http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~groland/pubs/The Russian Economy in 2005.pdf>; and Mark Harrison, "Are Command Economies Unstable? Why Did the Soviet Economy Collapse?" *Warwick Economic Research Papers*, no. 604 (May 3, 2001). There is no denying, however, that the late Soviet and early post-Soviet economy lagged far behind the most advanced industrialized countries, now multiplying in Asia as well as Europe, against which Russian leaders have always measured their achievements.

39. Donna Bahry, "Ethnicity and Equality in Post-Communist Economic Transition: Evidence from Russia's Republics," *Europe-Asia Studies* 54, no. 5 (2002): 673–699.

40. Harley Balzer, "The Putin Thesis and Russian Energy Policy," *Post-Soviet Affairs* 21, no. 3 (2005): 210–235, quotation on p. 217.

41. Alfred J. Rieber, "Zheleznye dorogi i ekonomicheskoe razvitiie: istoki sistemy Reitera," *Stranitsy rossiiskoi istorii. Problemy, sobytie, lyudi. Sbornik statei v chest' Borisa Vasilevicha Ananicha* (St. Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2003), pp. 150–178.

42. When Andrei Ilarionov resigned as Putin's top economic adviser he noted unhappily that "the state has evolved in quite different directions" from pursuing a liberal economic policy. Quoted in Peter Gumbel, "Putin's Power Surge," *Time Europe* May 9, 2006; for potential problems for Western investors see Timothy Frye, "Creditable Commitment and Property Rights: Evidence from Russia," *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 3 (August 2004): 453–466.

43. For a comparative treatment unfavorable to Russia's international financial position see Michael S. Bernstam and Alvin Rabushka, "China versus Russia: International Bankers Run a Natural Experiment," *The Russian Economy* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, April 13, 2006), <http://www.russianeconomy.org/comments/041306.html>.

44. Vladimir Yevtushenko, "Russian Petrodollars Will Have to Move Back," *Russia in Global Affairs*, March 24, 2003, <http://eng-global-affairs.ru/numbers/2/467.html>. In 2004 the per capita GDP of the Russian Federation was 24 percent of that of the United States (as compared with 43 percent in 1975), leading Putin's economic adviser, Andrei Ilarionov, to conclude: "By modern standards of well-being, Russia remains a fundamentally impoverished country." Quoted in "A Long-Term Project for Russia," *Russian Global Affairs*, no. 3 (July–September 2005), <http://eng-globalaffairs.ru/numbers/12/939.html>. Opposing Ilarionov's proposals for Russia to follow the U.S.–Hong Kong model of development, the spokesman for a return to autarky as the means for Russia to catch up with the West without losing its sovereignty is Mikhail Yaryev, "Fortress Russia," *Russian Global Affairs*, no. 3 (July–September 2005), <http://eng-globalaffairs.ru/numbers/12/939.html>.

45. David G. Victor and Nadejda M. Victor, "Axis of Oil?" *Foreign Affairs* (March/April, 2003), pp. 47–61; and Nadejda M. Victor, "Russia's Gas Crunch," *New York Times*, April 6, 2006, where she argues that the price increases reflect "problems connected by [Gazprom's] inefficient management and a looming decline in gas production."

46. Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vol. 5, pp. 117–120.

47. Nicholas I was convinced that young people traveling abroad "sometimes returned to Russia with the most incorrect (*lozhnyi*) notions about it, not understanding its real needs, laws, customs, norms and frequently language." The law of 1851 set strict limits on the time that anyone could remain abroad and attached severe penalties. During the period of the Great Reforms most of these restrictions were lifted. A. E. Ianovskii, "Pasporty zagranichnye," *Entsklopedicheskii slovar*, ed. F. A. Brogaуз and I. A. Efron (St. Petersburg: Efron, 1897), pp. 925–926.

48. Yuri Felshtinsky, "The Legal Foundations of the Immigration and Emigration Policy of the USSR, 1917–1927," *Soviet Studies* 34, no. 3 (July 1982): 327–348. Children of these immigrants could still be encountered in Moscow in the 1950s.

49. Marc Raeff, *Russia Abroad: A Cultural History of the Russian Emigration, 1919–1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). The full story remains to be told. For a valuable bibliography, see *Bibliothèque russe de l'institut d'études slaves—L'émigration russe: Revues et recueils, 1920–1980, index général des articles* (Paris: Institut d'Études Slaves, 1988).

50. I. I. Petrov, "Zabota partii ob ukreplenii pograniichnykh voisk (1939–1940)," *Voprosy istoriya KPSS*, no. 1 (1985): 94–99.

51. Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vol. 6, p. 396.

52. Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vol. 8, p. 265.

53. Stanley G. Payne, *The Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union and Communism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), argues strongly the position that this was precisely Stalin's goal in Spain.

54. If successful, this policy would have confronted Hitler with the potential of a three-front war. The question of how seriously Stalin was committed to fulfilling the terms of this alliance has recently been reviewed and revised to suggest that it was Romanian opposition to transit rights of the Red Army, not Soviet reluctance to oppose Hitler, that blocked the conclusion of a grand alliance to stop German aggression. Hugh Ragsdale, *The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

55. According to Litvinov, "our commission, with the approval of the government was to prepare its work without considering (*ignoriruya*) the possibility of serious social upheavals (*perevoroty*) in Europe and taking as its point of departure the existing structure." *Arkhiv vnesheinei politiki. Ministerstvo inostrannykh del*, fond 0512, opis 2, dela 4, protocol 5, list 31. See also Aleksei M. Filatov, "Problems of Post-War Construction in Soviet Foreign Policy Conceptions During World War II," in *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943–53*, ed. Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (New York: St. Martin's

Press, 1996), pp. 3–23; and A. A. Danilov and A. V. Pyzhikov, *Rozhdenie sverkhderzhavy SSSR v pervye poslevoennye gody* (Moscow: Rosspen, 2001), pp. 15–17.

56. For specific case studies of where these combinations succeeded and where they failed for the communists, see Alfred J. Rieber, “Zhdanov in Finland” (Carl Beck Papers, no. 107, University of Pittsburgh, 1995), and Rieber, “The Crack in the Plaster: Crisis in Rumania and the Origins of the Cold War,” *Journal of Modern History* 76, no. 1 (March 2004): 62–106. For evidence that communist parties in Western Europe were pursuing similar goals under much less favorable conditions, see Rieber, *Stalin and the French Communist Party, 1941–1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).

57. On Iran, see David Nissman, *The Soviet Union and Iranian Azerbaijan: The Use of Nationalism for Political Penetration* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987); Stephen L. McFarland, “A Peripheral View of the Origins of the Cold War: The Crisis in Iran, 1941–1947,” *Diplomatic History*, no. 4 (Fall 1980): 333–351, and Rouhallah K. Famazani, *Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941–1973* (Charlottesville: University of North Carolina Press, 1975). Russian military intervention and Bolshevik penetration of Azerbaijan had long and complex histories. See “Iranian Relations with Russia and the Soviet Union,” in *Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 7, eds. Peter Avery, G. R. G. Hambly, and C. Melville; Firuz Kazemzadeh, *Russia and Britain in Persia, 1864–1914: A Study in Imperialism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); and Chosroe Chaqueri, *The Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran, 1920–1921: Birth of the Trauma* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995); for Xinjiang, see Alan S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-tsai, *Sinking: Pawn of Pivots?* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1958), which makes the comparison with Azerbaijan; for Outer Mongolia, see Robert A. Rupen, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century*, part 1 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964); for China, see Odd Arne Westad, *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

58. Maxim Litvinov made the argument to an American reporter that Soviet foreign policy was still guided by the antiquated belief that security was synonymous with expansion and control of territory. Vojtech Mastny, “The Cassandra in the Foreign Commissariat: Maxim Litvinov and the Cold War,” *Foreign Affairs* 54 (January 1976): 373.

59. This included Czechoslovakia, which was not yet under full communist control. G. P. Murashko, T. V. Volokitina, T. M. Islamov, A. F. Nosova and L. A. Rogovaia, eds. *Vostochnaya Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivov, 1944–1953 gg.* 2 vols. (Novosibirsk: Sibirskii khronograf, 1997–1998), vol. 1, p. 675.

60. I. S. Girenko, *Stalin-Tito* (Moscow: Izd. Politicheskoi literatury, 1992); Ivo Banac, *With Stalin Against Tito: Cominform Splits in Yugoslav Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 110–116, 123–124.

61. Odd Arne Westad, “Concerning the Situation in ‘A’: New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan,” *Bulletin (Cold War International History Project [CWIHP])*, nos. 8/9, pp. 128–130, 137–144.

62. *Documents on International Affairs* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1951), pp. 317–318. Although the actual effect was minimal, the U.S. administration's rhetoric of liberation stressed the need, in John Foster Dulles's words, “to break up [the Soviet Union] from within.” Robert Divine, *Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, 1940–1960*, vol. 2 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), p. 51.

63. Quoted in Norman Naimark, “The Soviet Occupation: Moscow's Man in (East) Berlin,” *Bulletin (CWIHP)*, no. 4 (Fall 1994): 48.

64. USSR Council of Ministers Order, “On Measures to Improve the Health of the Political Situation in the GDR, 2 June 1953,” *Bulletin (CWIHP)*, no. 10 (March 1998): 79.

65. Ferenc A. Vali, *Rift and Revolution in Hungary: Nationalism Versus Communism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), pp. 438–439.

66. Quoted in Hope Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete Rose: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamic of Soviet–East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–1961” (Cold War International Working Papers, no. 5, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, 1993), p. 39.

67. Stephen Szabo, *The Diplomacy of German Unification* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); and Hans-Herman Hertle, “The Fall of the Wall: The Unintended Self-Dissolution of East Germany's Ruling Regime,” *Bulletin (CWIHP)*, nos. 12/13 (Fall and Winter 2001): 133, 154–158.

68. Stalin repeatedly reminded the communist parties of Eastern Europe after the war that they did not need to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat because the Soviet Union would prevent the outbreak of civil war and foreign intervention in their countries. See, for example, his comments to the Polish communists in May 1946. Murashenko, *Vostochnaya Evropa*, vol. 1, pp. 456–458; and discussion in Alfred J. Rieber, “Stalin as Foreign Policy Maker,” in *Stalin: A New History*, ed. Sarah Davies and James Harris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 154.

69. For the early history of the growing alienation, see Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), especially pp. 26–28, 121–122.

70. Peter C. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 51–94, 133–173, 511–531.

71. Thomas W. Robinson, “The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development, and the March 1969 Clashes,” *American Political Science Review* 66, no. 4 (December 1972): 1175–1202.

72. Robin Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy: The Brezhnev Years* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 104–105, 112.

73. Jeanne L. Wilson, *Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese Relations in the Post-Soviet Era* (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 2004), p. 116.

74. China had its own history of porous frontiers that was older and more turbulent than that of Russia. The persistence of this factor shows up in the multiple frontier wars fought by the Chinese Communists after 1950 on their frontiers with Korea,

India, and Vietnam as well as their occupation of Tibet, repression of Muslim dis-sension in Xinjiang, and little cold war with Taiwan.

75. Simultaneous with the disturbances in Hungary in June 1956 the Poznan riots in Poland moved Khrushchev to declare that the violence had been provoked by the imperialists with the aim of "fomenting disunity" within the bloc and "destroying [the socialist countries] one by one." Cited in Mark Kramer, "New Evidence on Soviet Decision Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises," *Bulletin (CWIHP)*, nos. 8/9 (Winter 1996-97): 361.

76. *Pravda*, November 13, 1968. Brezhnev later denied that this constituted a new doctrine of "limited sovereignty." *Pravda*, September 23, 1971.

77. E. A. Chirkova, "Revolutsiia 1848-1849 godov i politika Rossii," in O. V. Orlik, V. N. Vinogradov, A. G. Ignat'ev and V. N. Ponomarev, *Istoriia vneshei politiki Rossii. Pervaia polovina XIX veka* (Ot voim Rossii protiv Napoleona do Parizhskogo mira 1856 g.) (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1993), p. 357.

78. R. Craig Nation, *Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 308; Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, *At the Highest Level: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1994), p. 134.

79. As "peace-loving states" Khrushchev singled out India, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt, and Syria. But he made no mention of revolutionary national liberation movements, referring only to a disintegrating colonial system. *Pravda*, February 15, 1956. It was more difficult for Molotov to change course. He conceded that capitalist encirclement no longer existed, yet he denounced "the ring of bases situated around the Soviet Union" and the U.S. talk of finding "a principal use for atomic weapons in Europe." *Pravda*, February 20, 1956.

80. This move was preceded less than a year earlier, in August 1961, by the construction of the Berlin Wall, which plugged the last serious loophole in the porous frontiers of the continental Soviet bloc.

81. Bruce D. Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 26-27, 58-59, and Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, pp. 117-126, agree on the great significance of 1973 for the joint recognition of equality as the basis for détente, but are more reluctant to make a direct connection with the development of a more radical Soviet policy toward national liberation movements.

82. The main innovative character of the debate introduced two revisions of Stalinism by placing greater emphasis both on subjective factors in defining nation and on intrinsic factors (as opposed to the inspiration of the October Revolution) in sparking national liberation movements. Galia Golan, *The Soviet Union and the National Liberation Movements in the Third World* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 16-22, 37-38.

83. *Ibid.*, pp. 162-166, 262-265, 323.

84. Alexander Dallin, *Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 67-68, 119-120. Dallin characterizes the long his-

tory of Russian and Soviet sensitivities to border violations as constituting "an almost visceral response" that remained even after Stalin's death "tenaciously persistent in at least some parts of the population and the elite in particular." *Ibid.*, pp. 70-72. For the U-2 incident, see David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, *The U-2 Affair* (New York: Random House, 1962).

85. There were wide swings in the tone of the U.S. broadcasts. For a highly critical view of the quality of programming and especially the political role of émigrés in Radio Liberty, see Ludmilla Alexeyeva, *U.S. Broadcasting to the Soviet Union* (New York: Helsinki Watch Committee, 1986). Alexeyeva had been an active dissident until her emigration from the Soviet Union in the 1970s.

86. Martin Nelson, *War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997), pp. 91-93.

87. The decision to come clean came only after Gorbachev won a heated debate within the Politburo. Gorbachev, *Zhizn i reformy*, vol. 1, pp. 302-303. Gorbachev's decision to stop the jamming was unilateral, although it was preceded by negotiations between his close adviser Alexander Yakovlev and Charles Z. Wick, head of the United States Information Agency. Arch Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000), pp. 222-223.

88. Puddington, *Broadcasting Freedom*, pp. 297-299; and Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 63.

89. Given the enormous problems of establishing ethnic identity in Russia, the Soviet Union, and the Russian Federation, population statistics on the nationalities can only be approximate. See the discussion in Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Inheriting the Soviet Policy Toolbox: Russia's Dilemma over Ascriptive Nationality," *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 6 (September 1999): 1069-1087; and Eric D. Weitz, "Racial Policies Without the Concept of Race: Reevaluation of Soviet Ethnic and National Purges," *Slavic Review* 61, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 1-43.

90. Alfred J. Rieber, "Stalin: Man of the Borderlands," *American Historical Review* 106, no. 5 (December 2001): 1651-1691.

91. Stalin, *Sochineniya*, vol. 4, pp. 74-75, 162, 236-237, 372. See also Rieber, "Stalin," pp. 1683-1684.

92. To be sure, such accusations were also leveled at major figures in the great purge trials, but this does not invalidate the claim that they were originally designed to transform a right, that is, to self-determination of the proletariat as a class, into an obligation, that is, to repress national aspirations associated with the class enemy, the bourgeoisie.

93. In response to a question from an Azeri member of the Mussavet Party, who asked Stalin why he believed that socialism did not suit Iran while he supported the establishment of a Soviet republic in the far more backward Turkestan, the Soviet leader stated, "Nonetheless, in Turkestan there is an intelligentsia who completed Russian schools." Quoted in M. E. Rasuladze, "Vospominaniya o I.V. Staline,"

Vostochnyi ekspress, no. 1 (November 1993): 49. Rasuladze perceptively replied, "However, you agree this is not a Marxist reason."

94. Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 12–13 and passim. For the abandonment of political *korenizatsiia* in the 1930s, see Gerhard Simon, *Nationalism and Policy Toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991).

95. Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire*, pp. 9, 31, 41. In 1929 Stalin rebuffed proposals to transfer additional districts of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic to Ukraine: "We change our borders too often. We must be especially careful since such changes provoke enormous resistance from some Russians." Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 70.

96. L. N. Nezhtinskii, "Byla li voennaya ugroza SSSR v kontse 20-x -nachale 30-x godov?" *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 6 (June 1990): 14–30.

97. O. N. Ken and A. I. Rupasov, *Politbiuro TsK VKP (b) i otnosheniia SSSR s zapadnymi sosednimi gosudarstvami (konets 20–30-kh gg.). Problemy. Dokumenty. Opyt kolleniariia*, part 1: 1928–1934 (St. Petersburg: Evropeiskii Dom, 2000), pp. 484–485. A special commission of the Politburo for studying the security of the frontier zone had been established as early as 1925. *Ibid.*, p. 486.

98. The defensive position of the Narkomindel was that Soviet diplomacy should seek to prevent the Poles "from exploiting West Ukraine and West Belarus as 'Piedmont' in the struggle against the Ukrainian and Belorussian Soviet Republics." Stalin made the connection more explicit when he warned the Poles, "We will judge your relations with the Germans and us by your 'work' in the Soviet Ukraine." Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 491, 497, citing material from archives.

99. Abroad he imposed a new Comintern line at the Eighth Congress, reversing the policy of national self-determination aimed at the dismemberment of countries such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia into their component national parts, denouncing it as another form of nationalist deviation that could only pave the way for the expansion of Germany into Eastern Europe.

100. For the major shift in historiography and the teaching of history along these lines, see Lowell Tillet, *The Great Friendship: Soviet Historians on the Non-Russian Nationalities* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969).

101. Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review* 53, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 414–452; Roman Szporluk, "History and Ethnocentrism," in *Ethnic Russia in the USSR*, ed. Edward Allworth (New York: Pergamon, 1980), pp. 41–54; and Terry Martin, "The Origins of Ethnic Cleansing," *Journal of Modern History* 70, no. 4 (December 1998): 813–861.

102. Andrea Graziosi, *The Great Soviet Peasant War: Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917–1933* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 20, 27, 54, 63, 67.

103. Hiroaki Kuromiya, *Freedom and Terror in the Donbas: A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, 1870s–1990s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 231–235.

104. N. F. Bugai, L. Beria—I. Stalinu: *Soglasno Vashemu ukazaniyu* (Moscow: AIRO XX, 1995), pp. 8–25; and Pavel Polian, *Ne po svoei vole: Istoriia i geografiia prindielnykh migratsii v SSSR* (Moscow: OGI-Memorial, 2001), pp. 84–94. Officials of the Ministry of Interior later described the resettlement "not as a measure of repression but as a precautionary measure with respect to cleansing (*ochishchenie*) the frontier region with Japan." Bugai, L. Beria, p. 22.

105. S. T. Verigin and L. V. Suni, "Pereselenie ingermandtsev v Kareliu v kontse 1940-kh godov," in E. I. Klementev and V. N. Birin (eds.), *Karelii, Finny: Problemy etnicheskoi istorii* (Moscow, Institut etnologii i antropologii RAN, 1992), pp. 200–215; V. S. Parsadanova, "Deportatsiia naseleniia iz Zapadnoi Ukrainy i Zapadnoi Belorussii v 1939–1941 gg.," *Novaya i noveishaya istoriia*, no. 2 (February 1989): 26–44; and N. S. Lebedeva, "The Deportation of the Polish Population to the USSR, 1939–41," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition* 16, nos. 1/2 (March–June 2000): 28–45.

106. Bugai, L. Beria, pp. 27–47; and Polian, *Ne po svoei vole*, pp. 215–216. For a thorough exploration of the parallels with the tsarist expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Jews and Germans from the western frontier zone from 1914 to 1916, see Peter Gatrell, *A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia During World War I* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).

107. Alfred J. Rieber, "Civil Wars in the Soviet Union," *Kritika* 4, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 129–162; and Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

108. Bugai, L. Beria, pp. 61–68, 96–101, 119–131, 143–154, 163–169. The prospect of war with Turkey in 1943 automatically touched off fears about the Muslim population along the border between Georgia and Turkey, a highly mixed frontier zone. In one district, for example, the census of 1926 counted 24,353 Georgians, 29,170 Turks, 15,565 Armenians, 3,094 Kurds, and only 167 Russians, with a scattering of Greeks, Tatars, and Jews. *Ibid.*, p. 164. For a selection of documents indicating the sensitivity of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) to border incidents along the Turkish and Iranian frontiers in the first year of war, see E. D. Solovet and A. I. Chugunov, eds., *Pogranichnye voiska v gody Velikoi otechestvennoi voyny. Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Moscow: Nauka, 1976), pp. 603–609.

109. Bugai, L. Beria, pp. 198–199; and Polian, *Ne po svoei vole*, pp. 157–180. But the longer the process of rehabilitation, the slower the rate of return. According to the census of 1989, only 10 percent of the Meskhetian Turks had returned to the Azerbaijan Republic. Except for a small number in the Russian Republic, the remainder still reside in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. *Ibid.*, p. 178.

110. See Alfred J. Rieber, ed., *Forced Migration in Central and Eastern Europe, 1939–1950* (London: Frank Cass, 2000); and Norman Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001).

111. Cited in John Klier, *Imperial Russia's Jewish Question, 1855–1881* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 395. Klier concludes that “Externally [the Jews] were linked to the foreign foes of Russian national interests.” *Ibid.*
112. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global*, 3d ed. (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1989), pp. 341–342.
113. Minton Goldman, “United States Policy and Soviet Jewish Emigration from Nixon to Bush,” in *Jews and Jewish Life in Russia and the Soviet Union*, ed. Yaacov Ro’i (Ilford, Essex: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 338–358; Marshall Goldman, “Soviet-American Trade and Soviet Jewish Emigration: Should a Policy Change Be Made by the American Jewish Community?” in *Soviet Jewry in the 1980s: The Politics of Anti-Semitism and Emigration and the Dynamics of Resettlement*, ed. Robert O. Freedman (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989).
114. *Pravda*, January 8, 1988, as cited in Zvi Gitelman, “Ethnopolitics and the Future of the Former Soviet Union,” in *The Politics of Nationality and the Erosion of the USSR*, ed. Zvi Gitelman (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), p. 5.
115. Gorbachev, *Zhizn i reformy*, vol. 1, p. 280. Gorbachev’s simultaneous calls for speeding up (*uskorenie*) scientific and technological innovation and introducing economic reform that would contain some elements of the market economy make this connection abundantly clear. See *ibid.*, pp. 203, 294. See also Archie Brown, *The Gorbachev Factor* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 122–123.
116. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet Union*, especially pp. 27–32, 48, 68, 74, quotation at p. 29. As key moments in the process, he cites the protest of the Crimean Tatars as having given it structure; the Armenian movement to politicize the Karabakh issue as having constituted the first major wave; and the Baltic peoples as having undertaken a secessionist mobilization for the first time. *Ibid.*, pp. 60–62, 64, 160–162. For similarities and differences in the case of the Central Asian republics, see Yaacov Ro’i, “Nationalism in Central Asia in the Context of Glasnost and Perestroika,” in Gitelman, *The Politics of Nationality*, pp. 50–76.
117. Gorbachev’s failure to understand the profound emotional and political importance of nationalism can be exaggerated. He was not as ignorant of the problem as many observers have maintained. Cf. Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, pp. 181–185, 226–227, 382–383.
118. Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II*, pp. 343–344.
119. Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), pp. 54, 222. At the same time Gorbachev denounced the use of selective “quotations” to prove that Lenin intended to impose world revolution. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
120. For the repeated failure of “organic unity” of the Left, see Paolo Spriano, *Stalin and the European Communists* (London: Verso, 1985).

121. Immediately after the Crimean defeat, Russia attempted to align with its former enemy France. When the Polish issue disrupted that policy, it turned to Prussia-Germany, and by the 1890s it had returned to a French alliance.

122. Vojtech Mastny, “The Cassandra in the Foreign Commissariat: Maxim Litvinov and the Cold War,” *Foreign Affairs* 54 (January 1976), pp. 366–376.

123. F. Chuev, *Sto sorok besed s Molotovym. Iz dnevniika F. Chueva* (Moscow: Terra, 1991), pp. 98–99. Even a cursory comparison of Soviet diplomatic dispatches written in the 1930s with those composed in the 1940s and 1950s confirms Molotov’s verdict. The differences begin to show up most clearly in Ministerstvo Inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, *Dokumenty vnesnoi politiki, 1942–22 iyunia 1941* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1998). They became more pronounced through the war years. See Murashenko, *Vostochnaya Evropa*. Western diplomats registered similar if harsher views on the indifference or ignorance of Soviet diplomats toward established standards of international conduct. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925–1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Gen. John Deane, *The Strange Alliance* (New York: Murray, 1946); Raymond Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson, eds., *Negotiating with the Russians* (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1951); and W. Averill Harriman, *Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941–1946* (New York: Random House, 1975).

124. This is not the place for a full-scale review of the extensive changes that took place in the intellectual and cultural life of Western Europe and the United States as a response to the nature of the Soviet system and Soviet foreign policy. The centerpieces were the theory of totalitarianism and the grand narrative of Western civilization. For the best introduction to the former, see Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). There is no good analysis of the latter phenomenon, but see Gilbert Allardyce, “The Rise and Fall of the Western Civilization Course,” *American Historical Review* 87, no. 3 (June 1982): 695–725.

125. At the end of his life Lenin acknowledged that it was an error to have imposed on foreign communist parties an organizational resolution “permeated through and through with the Russian spirit. . . . It is completely incomprehensible to foreigners and they will not be satisfied to hang it in the corner like an icon and pray to it,” Lenin, *Sochineniya*, vol. 27 (Moscow: Partizdat, 1937), pp. 354–355. But his warning was ignored.

126. H. Gordon Skilling, “People’s Democracy in Soviet Theory,” *Soviet Studies* 3, no. 1 (July 1951): 16–33; and Karen Brutsents, *National Liberation Movements Today*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Progress, 1977), pp. 9–55. The concept of “revolutionary democracy” was a Khrushchev innovation.

127. In each of these cases strong elements within the local communist parties resisted or denounced the Soviet model as incompatible with their own cultural traditions.

128. The literature on this subject is extensive. I have drawn insights in particular from Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, vol. 3, *The Breakdown* (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1978); and James H. Satterwhite, *Varieties of Marxist Humanism: Philosophical Revisionism in Postwar Eastern Europe* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1992).

129. Kramer, "New Evidence on Soviet Decision Making." For concerns about the effect of the Prague Spring on internal stability in Ukraine, see Grey Hodnett and Peter Potichnyj, "The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis"; Kramer, "Ukraine and the Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968," pp. 234–247; and Mark Kramer, "Soviet Moldavia and the 1968 Czechoslovak Crisis: A Report on the Political 'Spill-Over,'" *Bulletin (CWIHP)*, no. 11 (Winter 1998): 263.

130. Alexander Dallin, "Long Division and Fine Fractions," *Problems of Communism* 11, no. 2 (March–April 1962): 7–16.

131. Robert Legvold, "The Soviet Union and West European Communism," in *Eurocommunism and Détente*, ed. Rudolph L. Tokes (New York: New York University Press, 1978), pp. 314–384. See also Jiri Valenta, "Eurocommunism and the USSR," in *Eurocommunism Between East and West*, ed. Vernon V. Aspaturian, Jiri Valenta, and David P. Burke (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 103–123.

132. Schwartz also made clear that the Chinese Communist Party was neither a vanguard of the proletariat nor a peasant party, but "an elite of professional revolutionaries which has risen to power by basing itself on the dynamic of peasant discontent." Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 199, 201. Although Ho never made such extravagant claims, he, too, was critical of Eurocentrism and quietly shaped an eclectic revolutionary movement that blended Marxism-Leninism with Confucianist and patriotic, rather than class, elements. Huynh Kim Khanh, *Vietnamese Communism, 1925–1945* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 62, 74–85, 141.

133. I. V. Kovalev, "Dialog Stalina c Mao tze-tung," *Problemy dal'nogo vostoka*, no. 2 (February 1992): 79–80. After meeting Mao, Molotov told Stalin that he was not really a Marxist but some kind of Chinese Pugachev. Chuev, *Sto sorok besed s Molotovym*, p. 114. For details on Stalin's diplomatic dance with Mao, see Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), especially chap. 4 and appendix, docs. 6, 7, 8.

134. Quoted in Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 345. Mao's explanation that they could win over the Soviet leaders by persuasion was, in his view, simply an acknowledgment of Chinese superiority.

135. Chen Jian, "Deng Xiaoping, Mao's 'Continuous Revolution,' and the Path Toward the Sino-Soviet Split: A Rejoinder," *Bulletin (CWIHP)*, no. 10 (March 1998): 162–164, docs. 165–182. In February 1965 Mao told Soviet premier A. N. Kosygin that the struggle with the Soviet "revisionists" would last nine thousand years. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

136. For example, Central Committee resolutions of July 28, 1958, and June 4, 1959, ordered severe cutbacks in subscriptions by official state organs to foreign periodicals aside from technical and scientific material, in addition to careful screening and reduction of translations and publication of foreign literature. V. Iu. Afiani, chief ed., *Ideologicheskie komissii TsK KPSS 1958–1964: Dokumenty* (Moscow: Rossen, 1998), pp. 64–72, 172–175. Similar instructions dealt with foreign films. *Ibid.*, pp. 186–189.

137. Karl Aimermacher, "Partinoe upravlenie kulturoi i formy ee samoorganizatsii (1953–1964/67)," in Afiani, *Ideologicheskie komissii TsK KPSS 1958–1964*, pp. 19–22.

138. See, for example, the testimony of Dmitri Shostakovich, in Afiani, *Ideologicheskie komissii TsK KPSS 1958–1964*, pp. 499–503.

139. The failure of the ideological commissions to arrive at any theoretical guidelines for artistic expression left room for enlarging the parameters of socialist realism. In painting, a wide array of styles emerged under the umbrella of socialist realism. See Susan Reid, "The 'Art of Memory': Retrospectivism in the Soviet Painting of the Brezhnev Era," in *Art of the Soviets: Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture in a One-Party State, 1917–1992*, ed. Matthew Cullerne Brown and Brandon Taylor (Manchester, NY: Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 161–187. In the 1970s it was possible to hear the most advanced avant-garde music, at least for small ensembles, in private recitals at the Union of Soviet Composers. Poets and writers encountered more restrictions, but even here, limits were tested.

140. Sabine Dullin, "Les interprétations françaises du système soviétique," in *Le siècle des communismes*, ed. Michel Dreyfus (Paris: Les Éditions de l'Atelier, 2000), pp. 50–51, nn. 22, 24.

141. See the analysis in Dmitri Trenin and Aleksei V. Malashenko with Anatol Lieven, *Russia's Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004).

142. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

143. Andrey Makarychev, "Pskov at the Crossroads of Russia's Trans-border Relations with Estonia and Latvia: Between Provinciality and Marginality," *Europe-Asia Studies* 57, no. 3 (May 2005): 481–500; and Vladimir Kagansky, "Tsetr-Provintsyia-Granitsa. Osnovnye zony kul'turnogo landshtafta. 1997," <http://www.inme.ru/previous/Kagansky/Kagansky.htm>.

144. *Pravda*, September 7, 2004.

145. Dmitri Trenin, "Integrating Russia into the European Security System," *U.S.-Russia Relations: Opportunities for Cooperation. Thirtieth Conference, August 10–16, 2003* (Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 2003), p. 26.

146. Paul Kubicek, "Russian Energy Policy in the Caspian Basin," *World Affairs* 166, no. 4 (Spring 2004): 207–217. For the battle over the pipelines, see Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, *Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

147. Quoted in Leszek Buszynski, *Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), pp. 4–5.

148. David Kerr, "The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopolitics in Russia's Foreign Policy," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, no. 6 (1995): 977–988; and Peter Rutland, "Paradigms for Russian Policy in the Caspian Region," in Ebel and Menon, *Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, pp. 171–173.

149. For an excellent analytical summary of the growing tension between Russia and the European Union, see Olga Vlasova, "Pochemu nas razlyubila Evropa," *Ekspert* 7, no. 410, February 23, 2004. Following the enlargement of the European Union the Russians complained that the new East European members were bringing "phantoms of the past" into the organization. *Financial Times*, May 22, 2006.

150. Jennifer Moll and Richard Gowan, *Losing Ground? Russia's European Commitment to Human Rights* (London: Foreign Policy Center, 2005).

151. Dmitri V. Trenin, *The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002).

152. Jutta Scherrer analyzes the role of *kulturologiya*, a required subject in Russian universities though not official policy, which interprets Russia as a unique civilization that differs from Europe in many of its values. Scherrer, *Russland auf der Suche nach einer zivilisatorischen Identität* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003).

CHAPTER 5

Russian Concepts of National Security

Lawrence T. Caldwell

WHY SHOULD A VOLUME that attempts to place contemporary Russian foreign policy in its historical context devote a chapter to Russian concepts of national security? And how does it propose to differentiate national security from more traditional explorations of foreign policy? The answer to the first question is straightforward: Nowhere is the discrepancy between Russia's historical context and the factors that shape most countries' foreign policies more evident than in the means available to secure its ambitions. Today's Russia continues to experience the wrenching process of imperial collapse. The tragedy of the Beslan schoolchildren held hostage by Chechen militants in the fall of 2004 was, in part, a product of Moscow's inability to find peace with its loss of empire and its confusion about how to combine the demands of building a new Russian nation and accepting the contraction of Russian and Soviet ambitions abroad. This problem was painfully obvious in mid-2006, when Kremlin efforts to pressure Ukraine over natural gas, as well as to interfere in both Georgian and Moldovan politics during the first months of the year, strained relations with Europe and the United States. In early May Vice President Dick Cheney gave a speech at the Vilnius meeting with heads of state from the "new Europe" that attacked Kremlin policies at home and in the region. His speech precipitated a vituperative exchange between Russia and the United States before President Vladimir Putin stepped in to calm the tone of relations prior to the July St. Petersburg Summit of the Group of Eight. This rhetorical strain in Moscow-Washington relations developed over a region Moscow had long considered to be within its "sphere of influence."

President Boris Yeltsin's futile efforts to block the eastward expansion of NATO, Russia's clumsy attempts to interfere in the Serbian crises of the 1990s, and President Vladimir Putin's complete inability to affect U.S. policy in Iraq